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Abstract 
According to behavioral economists, a “nudge” is an attempt to steer individuals toward making 
desirable choices without affecting their range of choices. We draw on this concept, and design and 
examine nudges that exploit social influence’s effects to control individuals’ choices. Although 
recommendation agent research provides numerous insights into extending information systems 
and assisting end consumers, it lacks insights into extending enterprise information systems to 
assist organizations’ internal employees. We address this gap by demonstrating how enterprise 
recommendation agents (ERAs) and social nudges can be used to tackle a common challenge that 
enterprise information systems face. That is, we use an ERA to facilitate information (i.e., reports) 
retrieval in a business intelligence system. In addition, we use social nudges to steer users toward 
reusing specific recommended reports rather than choosing between recommended reports 
randomly. To test the effects of the ERA and the four social nudges, we conduct a within-subject 
lab experiment using 187 participants. We also conduct gaze analysis (“eye tracking”) to examine 
the impact of participants’ elaboration. The results of our logistic mixed-effects model show that 
the ERA and the proposed social nudges steer individuals toward certain choices. Specifically, the 
ERA steers users toward reusing certain reports. These theoretical findings also have high practical 
relevance and applicability: In an enterprise setting, the ERA allows employees to reuse existing 
resources (such as existing reports) more effectively across their organizations because employees 
can more easily find the reports they actually need. This, in turn, prevents the development of 
duplicate reports. 
Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Nudge, Social Influence, Recommender System, Workaround 
Systems, Laboratory Experiment, Eye Tracking, Elaboration 
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1 Introduction  
Employees in many organizations supplement their 
information systems (IS) with additional workaround 
systems (WS) to adapt their IS to daily work routines 
(Alter, 2014; Jasperson, Carter, & Zmud, 2005). For 
instance, employees frequently supplement their 
organizations’ core business intelligence systems 
(BIS) with spreadsheet applications when preparing 
business reports (Burton-Jones & Grange, 2013; 
Davenport, 2014; Li, Hsieh, & Rai, 2013). Generally, 
such WS are considered flexible and are very popular 
with end users (Bagayogo, Lapointe, & Bassellier, 
2014; Sun, 2012; Gass, Ortbach, Kretzer, Maedche, 
Niehaves, 2015). Since many employees have the 
expertise required to develop and/or change WS, the 
latter are well suited to implementing emerging 
requirements rapidly (Alter, 2014). For instance, 
using spreadsheet applications, many users can 
quickly and easily extend a report with additional 
fields (Panko & Aurigemma, 2010; Powell, Baker, & 




Lawson, 2008, 2009). However, from an 
organization’s perspective, the development and use 
of supplementary WS creates problems, such as the 
limited reuse of reports,1 inconsistent data, and poor 
decision-making if decisions are based on outdated 
and erroneous data (e.g., Brazel & Dang, 2008; Tyre 
& Orlikowski, 1994). In addition, the use of WS may 
also lead to flawed and nonstandard routines and 
procedures (Alter, 2014).  
To address these challenges, the extant literature has 
focused on two IS governance-based approaches 
(Tiwana & Kim, 2015). For the first approach, 
researchers focus on reducing the generation and use 
of WS by defining IS governance policies and 
enforcing compliance (Liang, Xue, & Wu, 2013; 
Rivard & Lapointe, 2012). Empirical studies in this 
stream examine, for instance, individuals’ compliance 
with organizational guidelines and policies 
(Abubakre, Ravishankar, & Coombs, 2015; Xue, 
Liang & Wu, 2011). However, recent articles indicate 
that attempts to prohibit the use of WS foster the use 
of “hidden” WS, known as shadow systems (e.g., 
Alter, 2014; Behrens, 2009).  
A second research stream centers on empowering 
employees and managing WS. This stream 
acknowledges the value of WS, allowing and 
empowering employees to build and use WS (Tiwana 
& Konsynski, 2010; Weill & Ross, 2005). However, 
additional organizational units need to be established 
to manage and balance the use of organizations’ core 
IS and supplementary WS. For instance, in the BIS 
context, these units are generally cross-functional and 
focus on tasks such as gathering and synthesizing 
requirements, integrating data, designing report 
templates, developing user authorization concepts, 
and defining data and application responsibilities 
(O’Neill, 2011; Unger, Kemper, & Russland, 2008). 
Unfortunately, establishing and running these 
additional, cross-functional organizational units 
creates high costs for organizations and, by 
introducing an additional governance layer, reduces 
the WS’ flexibility. Thus, both governance-based 
approaches have significant limitations.  
As a consequence, we suggest that BIS should 
recommend existing reports to users in order to 
complement governance-based approaches and to 
support report reuse. This supports reuse of reports 
and prevents users from creating redundant reports in 
WS. Specifically, BIS should be extended with 
recommendation agents (RAs) that help users search 
for required reports. RAs typically elicit users’ 
preferences and requirements, as well as recommend 
                                                     
1 In this paper, reuse refers to different individuals’ usage of 
an IS resource. It does not refer to repeated usage of the 
same IS resource by the same individual. 
items that address these. RAs therefore facilitate 
users’ information searches (Arazy, Kumar, & 
Shapira, 2010). For instance, many online stores 
adopt RAs to help them recommend products to their 
customers (Xiao & Benbasat, 2007). However, 
although RAs are very popular extensions to systems 
that target end consumers such as online stores (Li & 
Karahanna, 2015), they are rarely used as extensions 
to enterprise IS such as BIS. We make this distinction 
explicit by referring to RAs that extend enterprise IS 
as enterprise recommendation agents (ERAs). To date, 
ERAs have rarely been examined in the literature 
(Hess, Fuller, & Campbell, 2009), although 
information retrieval is very important in the enterprise 
IS context (Bernstein & Haas, 2008; Mukherjee & 
Mao, 2004). To address this gap and to support report 
reuse, the first objective of this paper is to extend a BIS 
with an ERA that recommends reports to users. By 
increasing the reuse of existing reports, such an ERA 
could prevent redundant reports, data inconsistencies 
and, eventually, poor decision-making.  
However, simply identifying and recommending 
reports is not sufficient to influence an individual’s 
decision to actually reuse a certain report. Instead, in 
line with Simon’s (1954) multistage decision-making 
process, the ERA must also influence an individual’s 
actual decision to click on a certain recommendation 
and, thus, to reuse a certain report. Hence, the second 
objective of this paper is to influence users to choose 
a specific report recommendation.  
We address this second objective by drawing on the 
body of works that behavioral economists have 
produced. It is well known that individuals’ behaviors 
are not entirely rational, because their cognitive 
biases influence individuals (Goes, 2013). For 
instance, changing how different options are 
presented to individuals affects their choices (Hanna, 
2015). Hence, even if the range of available choices is 
not affected, individuals can be enticed to make 
certain choices. Social psychologists and behavioral 
economists Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2003) 
refer to this form of influencing as a nudge. Thaler 
was recently awarded with the prestigious Nobel 
Prize in Economic Sciences (The Royal Swedish 
Academy of Science, 2017) for his work. Designing 
an ERA that influences users’ report recommendation 
choices is just such a nudge. 
To support report reuse, a nudge should be based on a 
cognitive bias that frequently occurs in organizational 
settings. In particular, the ERA in this study exploits 
the effects of previous users’ social influence. The 
social influence of one individual on another is a 
well-known phenomenon in organizations. For 
instance, the hierarchical power of individuals often 
influences others in organizations (Clegg, 2013; 
Courpasson, Golsorkhi, & Salaz, 2012). 
Consequently, we refer to the ERA’s effects as social 




nudges. Building on behavioral economists’ concept 
of a nudge (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; Sunstein, 2014), 
we define two criteria for a social nudge: (1) a social 
nudge steers an individual’s choice toward a desired 
option by exploiting the effects of social influence 
between individuals, and (2) a social nudge does not 
change the range of choices available to the individual.  
Three common forms of social influence in 
organizations are social cohesion (proximity), 
institutional isomorphism (similarity of positions), 
and hierarchical power (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; 
Fiske, 2010; Friedkin & Cook, 1990). Building on 
these three forms of social influence, we design four 
social nudges. The first social nudge aims to control 
an individuals’ recommendation choices by 
exploiting their tendencies to be biased by proximity 
to other individuals. The second and third social 
nudges aim to determine individuals’ 
recommendation choices by exploiting their 
tendencies to be biased by the similarity between their 
positions in the organization and other individuals’ 
positions. Finally, the fourth social nudge aims to 
determine an individuals’ recommendation choices by 
exploiting those individuals’ tendencies to be biased 
by other individuals’ hierarchical power.  
As a third objective of this paper, we examine 
recommendation elaboration as a moderator. 
Although the described social nudges are based on 
social influence’s well-known effects, RAs provide 
an important new context. Since RAs display “social” 
information about previous users, but are not 
themselves human, only the displayed reference 
information should exert social influence. 
Researchers therefore need to determine whether 
individuals actually cognitively process the displayed 
information about previous users. For instance, an 
ERA seeking to steer users’ choices toward certain 
report recommendations can only succeed if users 
view and process the information it provides. If users 
fail to carefully evaluate—or engage in elaboration 
about—the provided information about previous 
users, this information will be ignored. We therefore 
follow Meservy et al.’s (2014) recommendations and 
use contemporary eye-tracking devices to reliably 
compute users’ fixation and to control for the 
moderating effects of recommendation elaboration.  
To summarize, this paper has three objectives: First, 
we propose an alternative approach to balancing BIS 
use and WS use. Extending a BIS with an ERA that 
supports report retrieval, and thus report reuse, 
reduces the need to develop supplementary WS. 
Second, we design and investigate the effects of four 
social nudges. Since employees in an organization 
work together and influence each other, the social 
influence of prior report users is a suitable bias in 
respect to designing nudges in organizational settings. 
Third, using eye-tracking technology, we highlight 
the importance of recommendation elaboration as a 
moderator of the effects of social nudges on 
individuals’ recommendation choices.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. 
Section 2 introduces the underlying theoretical 
foundations for designing social nudges, while 
Section 3 develops our hypotheses. The ERA that 
aims at steering users toward choosing certain report 
recommendations is introduced in Section 4, which 
also describes a lab experiment to evaluate the ERA’s 
effects. Subsequently, Section 5 presents our 
manipulation checks, data analysis, and the 
experiment results. The implications of our work for 
theory and practice are discussed in Section 6, and 
Section 7 concludes this paper. 
2 Theoretical Foundations 
2.1 Nudge 
The Nobel Prize Foundation introduced Richard 
Thaler’s 2017 Prize in Economic Sciences with the 
words “Humans behave in complex ways. Although we 
try to make rational decisions, we have limited cognitive 
abilities and limited willpower. . . . Moreover, cognitive 
abilities, self-control, and motivation can vary 
significantly across different individuals.” (The Royal 
Swedish Academy of Science, 2017, p. 1)  
In actuality, peoples’ decision-making is not entirely 
rational, because many environmental features can 
influence their decisions (Thaler, Sunstein, & Balz, 
2010). For instance, decisions can be influenced by 
changing a person’s environment. Literature refers to 
such intentional changes in one’s environment as 
nudges (Thaler et al., 2010). A nudge aims to 
influence decision-making in certain ways without 
people necessarily noticing that they have been 
influenced. Sunstein (2014, p. 17), one of the 
advocates of the nudge concept, defines a nudge as an 
“initiative that maintains freedom of choice while 
also steering people’s decisions in the right 
direction.” This definition is consistent with the 
meaning of a nudge in everyday life, which refers to a 
gentle hint or suggestion, and is the reverse of an 
obligation, a strict requirement, and/or the use of 
force (Halpern, 2015, p. 22).  
For example, a restaurant’s menu is a nudge. Even if 
the selection on the menu does not change, changing 
its presentation on the menu may affect a guest’s 
choice of food. For example, by clustering the items 
differently, using larger/smaller images of them, and 
showing/hiding their prices, restaurant managers can 
steer guests toward making certain choices (Thaler et 
al., 2010). A picture of a smoker’s lungs on a pack of 
cigarettes is another example of a nudge (Sunstein, 
2014). Although the picture does not force individuals 
to stop smoking, it presents the hazards of smoking, 




thereby steering individuals toward reducing the 
number of cigarettes they smoke. However, pictures and 
warnings are not the only form of nudges. Other popular 
forms of nudges include the disclosure of information, 
default rules that become individuals’ choices if they do 
not opt out, the framing of choices, and “cooling-off” 
periods (Hanna, 2015; Leonard, 2008).  
The nudge concept is based on a stream of behavioral 
economist research called libertarian paternalism 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). Advocates of this stream 
observe that there are ways of influencing decision-
making that do not limit liberty, but also do not quite 
fit the mold of ordinary persuasion. Because 
individuals are susceptible to various cognitive 
biases, the way that options are structured and 
presented affects their decision-making (Hanna, 
2015). Libertarian paternalism aims to exploit these 
effects in order to encourage more prudent decision-
making. In particular, libertarian paternalism 
promotes the use of nudges to create choice 
architectures. Like an architect who creates buildings, 
a choice architect creates a contextual background 
against which choices need to be made (Thaler et al., 
2010). By doing this, the choice architect deliberately 
builds a choice architecture that presents choices in a 
certain way and, thus, nudges individuals toward 
making certain choices (Sunstein, 2014).  
On the whole, we can highlight three essential nudge 
characteristics: first, a nudge does not restrict the 
choices available to an individual (Bovens, 2008; 
Cohen, 2013). Second, a nudge changes the 
environment in which choices are made (Sunstein, 
2014). Third, a nudge “harnesses cognitive biases for 
good” ends (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 8; Trout, 
2005, p. 432). Deception, or the deliberate 
withholding of information that one is obliged to 
disclose, is not considered a nudge (Hanna, 2015). 
Hausman and Welch (2010) describe a nudge as a 
preference-shaping intervention as opposed to a non-
preference-shaping intervention.  
The use of nudges may seem morally disputable to 
advocates of freedom of choice (Leonard, 2008). 
According to their criticism, any intentional influence 
of individuals’ decision-making should generally be 
avoided, including individuals’ rights to take risks 
and make errors. However, liberal paternalists counter 
that decisions are not made in a vacuum (Thaler et al., 
2010). Influences on choices are inevitable, whether 
they are intentional, or the product of any kind of 
conscious design (Sunstein, 2014). Hence, Sunstein 
(2014) argues that nudges should support individuals’ 
autonomy rather than reduce their freedom of choice. 
For instance, nudges may enable individuals to 
consider relevant alternatives that would otherwise be 
ignored due to information overload.  
IS research studies on examining and designing 
nudges are still very rare. However, there are related 
studies on cognitive biases (Goes, 2013). For 
instance, IS researchers have examined default 
options in the past (Thaler et al., 2010). Allen and 
Parsons (2010) have shown that providing anchors 
affects individuals’ decision-making and, specifically, 
that anchoring leads to an adjustment bias. If 
individuals who need to write program code are 
provided with an anchor (i.e., code pieces), they 
frequently fail to make sufficient changes to the 
anchor and are overconfident in their solution. 
Furthermore, Weinmann, Schneider, & vom Brocke, 
(2016) provide an overview of common forms of 
nudges and discuss them in the context of online 
product-rating platforms. These authors also suggest a 
process for designing and evaluating other forms of 
nudges (Weinmann, Schneider, & vom Brocke, 
2015). Our work follows their suggestions.  
In line with our second research objective, we design 
nudges to steer an individual toward choosing a 
certain report recommendation from a set of multiple 
recommendations. In particular, we focus on nudges 
that exploit social influence’s effects in order to 
control an individual’s recommendation choices. 
Social influence has been identified as an important 
determinant for explaining individuals’ behaviors in 
organizations and institutions (Tichy, Tushman, & 
Fombrun, 1979; Tsai & Goshal, 1998). Consequently, 
the following sections introduce forms of social 
influence that arise from social networks within 
organizations and organizational hierarchies. 
2.2 Social Influence 
2.2.1 Social Influence Based on Social 
Networks 
Social influence is a process through which 
individuals modify others’ behaviors, thoughts, and 
feelings (Cartwright, 1959; Lewin, 1951). Social 
psychology has examined many different forms and 
perspectives of social influence (Fang et al., 2015; 
Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). For instance, Fiske (2010) and 
Hogg (2010) have reviewed different forms of social 
influence. These include, for example, social 
cognition of attitude change as a consequence of 
influence, propaganda and the mass transformation of 
attitudes, interpersonal persuasion, the development 
and change of behavioral norms, behavioral 
regularities on people’s behavior, and of group 
socialization processes. Owing to the sheer number of 
effects based on social influence, the common 
approach to studying its effects is to focus on the 
specific effects in a particular context (Anderson & 
Kilduff, 2009). In this paper, we therefore focus on 
social influence processes that are particularly strong 
within organizations. Specifically, we focus on (1) 




social networks, because, from an employee’s 
perspective, organizational structures represent a 
social network (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003; Sparrowe, 
Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer, 2001; Tichy et al., 1979), 
and on (2) hierarchical power, because most 
organizations are based on hierarchical structures.  
There are two main approaches to researching social 
influence in social networks. Borgatti & Foster (2003) 
refer to them as a connectionist versus a structuralist 
approach (or a flow-based vs. a topology-based 
approach, or a relational vs. a structural approach). 
The connectionist approach highlights an 
interpersonal transmission process between those with 
preexisting social ties (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). 
Connectionists argue that, at its core, the social 
cohesion between two individuals (typically defined as 
the proximity between them) causes them to influence 
each other (Borgatti & Foster, 2003). In contrast, the 
structuralist approach emphasizes the structural 
similarity of nodes in a network, although there is not 
necessarily a tie that connects them. According to this 
approach, the extent to which individuals share similar 
isomorphic positions in a network determines the 
social influence they exert on each other.  
It is important to note that the effects that high 
proximity between individuals may have on social 
influence and the effects that the high isomorphic 
similarity between individuals’ positions may have on 
social influence may overlap. Consequently, IS 
researchers focusing on social influence have 
developed and tested hypotheses based on both the 
approaches. For instance, Singh and Phelps (2013) 
find that individuals’ decisions when choosing a 
license type for their open source projects are 
influenced by (1) the license type of the previous 
projects to which these individuals were closely 
connected, and by (2) the license choice of 
isomorphic similar projects (i.e., projects with 
similar social network structures). 
2.2.2 Social Influence Based on Power in 
Organizational Hierarchies 
Many organizations are based on hierarchical 
structures. Although recent studies indicate a shift to 
more heterarchical structures (Kellogg, Orlikowski, & 
Yates, 2006; Stark, 2009), organizations are still 
highly hierarchical (Courpasson, Golsorkhi, & Salaz, 
2012) and organizational hierarchies represent 
people’s most common daily experience of 
hierarchies outside the family (Fiske, 2010). 
Status and power form the bases of hierarchical 
differentiation in organizations (Anicich, Fast, 
Halevy, & Galinsky 2016; Clegg, Courpasson, & 
Phillips, 2006). Social psychologists define status as 
social respect, recognition, importance, and prestige 
(e.g., Fiske, 1993). In contrast, power is defined as 
the control over valued resources (e.g., Fiske, 1993; 
Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson , 2003; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008). Power and status often depend on each 
other (Clegg, 2013). For instance, as explained by Fiske 
(2010), many managers in institutional hierarchies are 
respected (status) and control resources (power). 
3 Hypothesis Development 
We design and evaluate an ERA that supports the 
reuse of reports. Insufficient report reuse is a common 
phenomenon and a serious problem for organizations, 
because it results in operational inefficiencies and 
poor decision-making. To address these issues, our 
ERA uses social nudges that aim to steer individuals 
toward choosing certain report recommendations and, 
thus, toward reusing certain desirable reports. In 
particular, we describe the effects of these social 
nudges on individuals’ recommendation choices. We 
model all nudges as external stimuli and individuals’ 
recommendation choice as responses to those stimuli. 
In addition, we include elaboration in our model. This 
is important, because in our context, stimuli are 
messages displayed on screens rather than “real” 
physical influences. Consequently, the effect of these 
messages on certain individuals depends on the extent 
to which these individuals process them, which is 
commonly referred to as elaboration (Angst & 
Agarwal, 2009; Bhattacherjee & Sanford, 2006; Ho & 
Bodoff, 2014; Meservy, Jensen, & Fadel, 2014). 
Elaboration is defined as the amount of message-
relevant thinking an individual engages in while 
evaluating a message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 
1986b). In our model, we examine elaboration as a 
moderator, because it may strengthen the effects of 
messages displayed on computer monitors. 
3.1 Social Nudges as External Stimuli 
We design specific nudges by drawing on theoretical 
knowledge about social influence in networks, because 
organizations can be viewed as networks (Kilduff & 
Tsai, 2003). We suggest effects based on (1) social 
cohesion and (2) institutional isomorphism. We also 
consider (3) power in organizational hierarchies, because 
most organizations are based on hierarchical structures. 
3.1.1 Social Cohesion: Social Influence Based 
on Proximity Between Individuals 
The connectionist view of social influence is based on 
the proximity between two individuals in a network, 
which is commonly referred to as social cohesion 
(e.g., Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). Social cohesion 
focuses on how two individuals are connected to each 
other and how they communicate; it is sometimes also 
referred to as the flow approach to social influence 
(Borgatti & Foster, 2003).  




Social cohesion refers to the ties between individuals. 
Marsden and Friedkin (1993) coined the term 
cohesion in terms of the number, length, and strength 
of the paths that connect actors in a network. 
According to this approach, the degree of proximity (i.e., 
the degree of social cohesion) between two individuals 
is high if they are directly tied in a network via a short 
connection. Conversely, the degree of proximity 
between two individuals is low if they are not connected, 
or only connected via many intermediaries.  
In line with the nudge concept, changing the 
presentation of recommendations may influence the 
recommendation a user chooses. Displaying 
information about the previous users of recommended 
items may specifically influence the choices of new 
users presented with a set of alternative recommended 
items. This study aims to exploit this potential bias 
using the effects of social influence.  
We therefore first draw on theoretical knowledge 
about social cohesion’s effects and suggest that new 
users are likely to choose a certain recommendation if 
the social cohesion between them and the previous 
user (about whom information is displayed) is high. 
As such, we suggest the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): High social cohesion between 
two individuals increases the probability that 
each of them will choose a recommended item 
associated with the other.  
Note that social cohesion focuses on the proximity 
between two individuals within a network. Multiple 
biasing factors could, however, change the effects of 
social cohesion; for instance, if two individuals had 
bad experiences when working together, this could 
reverse social cohesion’s effect. While H1 assumes 
that, as such, the effect of social cohesion is positive, 
biasing factors, such as bad experiences, could 
cause it to have a negative effect. That is, 
individuals would then be less likely to choose a 
recommended item associated with the other. 
However, we do not consider these possibilities in 
our study, because we focus on social cohesion and 
not on potentially biasing external factors. 
3.1.2 Institutional Isomorphism: Social 
Influence based on Similar Positions in 
Organizational Structures 
The structuralist view of social influence is based on 
the extent to which individuals have equivalent 
positions in an organizational structure. The 
institutional isomorphism concept best captures the 
process of structural equivalence in organizations 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Unlike social cohesion, 
isomorphism does not depend on proximity (Borgatti 
& Everett, 1992). In an isomorphic network, “nodes 
may be adjacent, distant, or completely unreachable 
from each other” (Borgatti & Everett, 1992).  
In this study, we use the concept of isomorphism 
rather than equivalence. Whereas structural 
equivalence only views two individuals as occupying 
the same position if they are connected to the same 
third individual, structural isomorphism views two 
individuals as occupying the same position if they are 
connected to corresponding others (Borgatti & 
Everett (1992). Isomorphism does not, therefore, 
depend on a direct connection and can be 
distinguished from social cohesion. Structural 
equivalence, however, is an inseparable part of social 
cohesion, as it requires links to the same individual 
(Borgatti & Everett, 1992). Furthermore, institutional 
isomorphism specifically addresses the structural 
determinants that individuals perceive (DiMaggio, 
1986). It does not consider, for example, 
psychological determinants, which are difficult to 
separate from the effects resulting from social 
cohesion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
In Hawley’s (1968) description, isomorphism is a 
constraining process that forces one actor to resemble 
other actors who face the same set of environmental 
conditions. Early research on institutional 
isomorphism focused on isomorphic processes at the 
organizational level. For instance, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) examined isomorphic processes that 
cause organizations to change and adapt the structural 
models of other organizations if these organizations 
are competitors that are more successful. However, 
the theory of isomorphism also applies to the 
individual level. Individual actors within 
organizations may adopt their colleagues’ successful 
practices. For instance, an internal blog may influence 
a software developer working in the US department 
of a global company, because another software 
developer in the same company wrote the blog. Even 
if the second software developer worked in Asia and 
was unconnected to the software developer in the US 
via a direct, personal tie, the similarity of their 
positions could cause the software developer in Asia 
to influence the American software developer. Note 
that the social influence exerted in this example arises 
from the individuals’ isomorphic positions within 
their organization—both individuals are software 
developers in the same organization.  
The effects of institutional isomorphism and social 
cohesion may, obviously, overlap and leverage each 
other (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Borgatti & Everett, 
1992). For instance, if the software developer in the 
US also knows the software developer in Asia 
personally, or if they are connected via the same 
supervisor, the influence would be all the stronger. 
This shows that social cohesion and institutional 
isomorphism complement each other.  
However, it is important to keep the key differentiator 
between the two in mind. While influence based on 
social cohesion depends on a tie between individuals, 




influence based on institutional isomorphism does not 
need a direct tie, but does require an understanding of 
the structure or context of the individuals’ 
relationships. Consequently, we also theorize that an 
individual is more likely to choose a report 
recommendation that is based on a colleague who 
works in an isomorphic position.  
We specifically examine business function and 
location (i.e., geographical regions, countries) as 
positions in organizations’ networks, because 
organizations are usually structured according to 
business function and/or location (Miles, 2012). For 
instance, in an organization, common business 
functions include accounting, marketing, IT, sales, 
and human resources. Since individuals working in 
the same business function are considered likely to 
cooperate and exchange resources and knowledge 
frequently, many organizations are primarily built on 
such functions. Consequently, we theorize as follows:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): High institutional isomorphism 
between two individuals (in terms of their 
primary business functions) increases the 
probability that both of them will choose a 
recommended item associated with the other.  
Organizations are also frequently structured according 
to locations. These may correspond directly to 
countries (e.g., Brazil, China, India, the US, and the 
UK), but also to more generic regions, such as time-
zone-based and continent-based regions (e.g., America, 
Europe-Middle-East-Africa, Asia-Pacific-Australia). 
Again, since employees in the same time-zone and/or 
the same country would be expected to be able to work 
together closely, many organizations are structured 
according to locations. We therefore theorize that:  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): High institutional isomorphism 
between two individuals (in terms of location) 
increases the probability that each of them 
will choose a recommended item associated 
with the other.  
In our study, we focus on these two social nudges 
based on institutional isomorphism. However, 
organizations, or researchers, could also design and 
test alternative social nudges based on institutional 
isomorphism. These could, for instance, focus on 
employees’ job roles, such as sales analysts, ad 
campaign analysts, software engineers, etc. In real 
organizations, institutional isomorphism in terms of 
job role seems to be an especially powerful basis for 
nudging employees toward reusing certain reports, 
because we assume that, for example, two sales 
analysts will use their BIS to achieve similar 
objectives. We did not investigate this nudge, because 
institutional isomorphism in terms of job roles and 
business functions (e.g., sales departments, marketing 
departments, IT departments) would be very similar. 
We therefore only focused on institutional 
isomorphism in terms of business function, because 
we assumed that job roles (e.g., ad campaign analysts) 
would be more difficult to understand in a lab setting 
than business functions (e.g., marketing departments). 
3.1.3 Power in Organizational Hierarchies  
Like social networks, power in social hierarchies 
often causes influence in terms of changing other 
people’s beliefs and behavior (Hogg, 2010). In 
general, in a hierarchy the upper levels have more 
power than the lower levels (Fiske, 2010).  
The items that a RA suggests are often at least partly 
based on their historical usage. For instance, a movie 
RA may suggest a movie to a new user, because 
another user, who seems to be similar to the 
(potential) new user, had watched it. In general, RAs 
based on structured information (e.g., movies 
categorized into movie genres) often provide more 
useful recommendations than those solely based on 
unstructured information, or substantially less 
structured information (e.g., uncategorized news 
articles) (Paterek, 2007). We therefore propose that 
using RAs for information retrieval within 
organizations is particularly useful, because they 
already have a structure that could be used to 
compute similarities between potential users. For 
instance, an ERA based on an organization’s 
hierarchy may suggest a report to an employee, because 
this employee’s supervisor used it in the past. Drawing 
on the effects of power within organizational hierarchies 
(Anicich et al., 2016; Clegg et al., 2006), we propose 
that an employee would prefer a recommendation from a 
relatively powerful user in the organization’s hierarchy 
who controls financial budgets and employees. Thus, we 
offer the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The probability that people will 
choose a recommended item associated with an 
individual increases in relation to the level of that 
individual’s power (in terms of his or her 
hierarchical position and control of financial 
budgets and employees).  
The hierarchical effect of power further affects the 
influence of social cohesion, or whether individuals 
know each other. Employees in a high-power 
position, such as directors, may influence other 
employees even if they are not directly connected to 
them. Conversely, employees who have low-power 
positions in the hierarchy positions, such as interns, 
generally only successfully influence directly 
connected employees (e.g., colleagues whom they 
directly assist), but are unlikely to influence other 
employees. Thus, the influence of social cohesion 
(i.e., proximity) for employees in lower 
organizational positions will be more important than 
it is for employees in higher organizational positions. 




Accordingly, we define an interaction effect between 
hierarchical power and social cohesion:  
Hypothesis 5 (H5): An individual’s degree of power 
(in terms of his or her hierarchical position and 
control over financial budgets and employees) 
moderates the effect of social cohesion between that 
individual and others. Specifically, higher levels of 
power weaken the influence of social cohesion. 
3.2 Recommendation Elaboration as 
Moderator 
Individuals’ decision-making is based on the 
identification of candidate options that are then 
evaluated and reduced to the most appropriate choice 
or choices (Simon, 1957). This process depends greatly 
on the degree to which an individual scrutinizes the set 
of available choices (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a, 
1986b). In our study, individuals had to choose from a 
set of available recommendations, and, although they 
were not familiar with the recommended item (i.e., 
the report), they could process information about the 
recommendation. For instance, they could consider 
information about the colleagues associated with 
recommended items. This is important, because 
individuals’ likelihood of engaging in effortful 
processing of such information determines their 
chosen recommendations.  
Petty and Cacioppo (1986a, 1986b) describe this 
likelihood in terms of an elaboration continuum. At 
the high end of the elaboration continuum, people 
assess all of the available information to obtain a 
carefully considered, although not necessarily 
unbiased, evaluation (Gawronski & Creighton, 2013). 
This means that the greater the extent to which 
individuals carefully consider a certain 
recommendation, the greater the probability that any 
additional information about the recommendation will 
influence them. For instance, if a recommendation is 
displayed with a short message describing the data on 
which the recommendation is based, this message is 
more likely to affect users who elaborate very 
extensively. Accordingly, at the low end of the 
elaboration continuum, people engage in considerably 
less scrutiny of object-relevant information 
(Gawronski & Creighton, 2013). Any additional 
information provided about a certain recommended 
item is therefore less likely to affect these individuals. 
In other words, if individuals do not engage in 
“recommendation elaboration,” they will ignore 
additional information about recommended items and 
choose recommendations randomly.  
Thus, the extent to which an individual carefully considers 
all the information related to a set of recommended 
items—i.e., recommendation elaboration—determines the 
effect that any additional information will have on that 
individual’s decision to choose a certain recommended 
item. Accordingly, we define the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 6a (H6a): The effect of providing 
information about the social cohesion between one 
individual and another individual associated with a 
recommended item increases in relation to that 
individual’s level of recommendation elaboration.  
Hypothesis 6b (H6b): The effect of providing 
information about institutional isomorphism (in 
terms of business function) between one individual 
and another individual associated with a 
recommended item increases in relation to that 
individual’s level of recommendation elaboration.  
Hypothesis 6c (H6c): The effect of providing 
information about institutional isomorphism (in 
terms of location) between one individual and 
another individual associated with a recommended 
item ) increases in relation to that individual’s 
level of recommendation elaboration.  
Hypothesis 6d (H6d): The effect of providing 
information about the power of an individual 
associated with a recommended item (in terms of 
hierarchical position and control over financial 
budgets and employees) increases in relation to that 
individual’s level of recommendation elaboration.  
As such, we believe that the effect of additional 
information about the social cohesion of previous 
users associated with the recommended items would 
depend on the new user’s level of recommendation 
elaboration (H1). Similarly, concerning the effect of 
institutional isomorphism, we theorize that additional 
information about institutional isomorphism in terms 
of business function (H2) and location (H3) of 
previous users influence only those high-elaboration 
individuals accustomed to carefully considering all 
related information before making a decision. Finally, 
we argue that the impact of providing information 
about previous users’ relative power (H4, H5) also 
depends on the level of elaboration of the new user, 
because users on the low end of the elaboration 
continuum would deem such information superfluous. 
3.3 Recommendation Choice as Response 
to Social Nudges  
In this section we examine individuals’ 
recommendation choices as responses to the defined 
social nudges. Currently, many RAs provide multiple 
recommendations, rather than just one. Individuals can 
therefore choose between several recommendations. In 
line with our hypotheses, we suggest that social nudges 
could be used to steer individuals toward choosing 
certain recommendations. We operationalize our 
measure of recommendation choice in Section 4.4. We 
do not examine any individual responses other than 
recommendation choice; recommendation choice is our 
study’s only dependent variable. 






Figure 1. Research Model 
Figure 1 summarizes our research model. In line with 
other IS studies focusing on various design features 
(e.g., Choi, Jiang, Xiao, & Kim, 2015; Day, Junglas, 
& Silva, 2009; Xu, Benbasat, & Cenfetelli, 2014; 
Zhang, Venkatesh, & Brown, 2011), we model our 
social nudges as independent variables. In addition to 
the hypotheses developed above, we examine the 
influence of four control variables: age, gender, 
nationality, and culture (measured as first language). 
4 Research Method 
To test our research model we conducted a laboratory 
experiment. Lab experiments are particularly suited to 
examine the temporal precedence of a cause and to 
eliminate alternative explanations of possible cause-
effect connections in the IS discipline (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979; Colquitt, 2008; Dennis & Valacich, 
2001; James, 1980). 
4.1 Material: BIS with ERA and Report 
Recommendations 
Our study uses a self-developed prototype of a web-
based BIS. This BIS is extended with an ERA that 
provides users with report recommendations. Figure 2 
shows a screenshot of the BIS and the ERA. The 
report recommendations (lower box on the left side of 
the screen) change every few seconds. 





Figure 2. BIS Extended with an ERA That Suggests Reports to Users 
All the participants in our experiment used the BIS 
with the ERA that recommends reports. The BIS 
provides users with business reports and the basic 
functionality for analyzing these reports, such as 
filtering reports, sorting results, adjusting the number 
of rows shown on a single webpage, etc. Specifically, 
we used Microsoft’s publicly available “Contoso” 
(Microsoft, 2016) BIS training data as the dataset. 
This dataset contains data of an electronics retailer 
called “Contoso.” The data includes all of Contoso’s 
sales transactions over a period of three years, as well 
as detailed information about its stores, locations, 
customers, orders, marketing campaigns, and 
inventory stocks. Using this dataset, a simulation 
program created a set of 75 reports. These reports 
only provide information in tables and not in charts, 
dashboards, or other visualizations. The BIS provides 
access to these reports. Although each report is 
unique, parts of the reports may overlap, which means 
that some reports may contain the same columns. 
Consequently, in some cases, users may find the 
information they require in multiple reports.  
The BIS provides a list of all reports and an ERA 
recommending reports to support users searching for 
certain information. The BIS entry page shows a list 
of all the reports on the left side of the screen. Users 
can scroll through the list and click on the names of 
reports to open them. All the report names start with 
the type of business facts they provide. Based on the 
Contoso dataset, five types of business facts are 
distinguished: sales transactions, orders, inventory 
stocks, product categories, and promotions. Examples of 
report names are “Sales Report 1” and “Orders Report 4.”  
In addition to this list of available reports, the BIS 
provides an ERA that recommends reports for users. 
It is important to note that, linked to a recommended 
report, each report recommendation provides 
additional information about a previous user. In 
particular, each recommendation provides 
information about previous users in terms of their 
business functions (e.g., sales department), the 
locations in which they work (e.g., the USA), and 
their positions (e.g., project manager). The 
recommendation also indicates whether the 
recommended report’s previous user is directly 
connected to the current users (e.g., “Your director . . 
.”) or not (e.g. “A director . . .”). For instance, an 
example recommendation would be “Michael, a 
project manager from the Sales Department in the 
USA liked this report” whereas “this report” is a link 
that opens the recommended report. Note that the 
recommendation does not show the name of the 
recommended report, nor does the gender of the 
previous report users change within a set of 
alternatively displayed report recommendations. The 
experiment participants cannot therefore select a 
certain report recommendation on the grounds of 
gender preferences. We only use common names 
derived from an online database of baby names 
(World-English, 2015).  
Our experiment used additional information provided 
about previous users of recommended reports to 
nudge new users toward choosing certain report 
recommendations. The information allowed new 
users to infer the social influence of the previous 
report users. Extant studies have shown that users 
viewing information about others on their screen 




associate the information with those people 
(Guadagno, Swinth, & Blascovich, 2011; Teubner, 
Adam, & Riordan, 2015). This additional information 
provided in our experiment conveyed the social influence 
of those previous users. We used this effect to generate 
different social nudges in our experiment. Table 1 lists our 
experimental treatments of social nudges. In line with 
these treatments, Table 2 shows exemplary report 
recommendations as provided to users by the ERA.
 
Table 1. Experimental Treatments of Social Nudges 
Social Nudge Experimental Treatment 
Social cohesion High “Your [project manager . . .]”  
Low “A [project manager . . .]”  
Institutional isomorphism in terms of business function High Same department  
Medium Similar, closely related department (e.g., sales and marketing)  
Low Different, unrelated department (e.g., sales and risk mgmt.)  
Institutional isomorphism in terms of location High Same country  
Medium Different country from same continent  
Low Different country from different continent  
Hierarchical power High Director  
Medium Project manager, project leader  
Low Intern  
   
Table 2. Example Report Recommendations 
Social 
cohesion 
Institutional isomorphism as Hierarchical 
power Example report recommendation (a) bus. funct.  (b) location 
High High High High 
“Your director from the Sales Department in Germany liked 
this report.”  
Low Medium Medium Medium 
“A project leader from the Marketing Department in France 
liked this report.”  
Low Low Low Low 
“An intern from the Risk Management Department in Canada 
liked this report.”  
4.2 Experiment Design 
Our experimental treatments distinguished between 
(a) low and high levels of social cohesion, (b) low, 
medium, and high levels of institutional isomorphism 
in terms of business function, (c) low, medium, and 
high levels of institutional isomorphism in terms of 
location, and (d) low, medium, and high levels of 
power in organizational hierarchies.  
Since we argue that there is an interaction effect 
between social cohesion and power in organizational 
hierarchies (H5), we needed a 2x3 cross-factorial 
design between these treatments. Crossing this design 
with additional treatments was not reasonable, 




because (1) we did not theorize any interaction effects 
with institutional isomorphism, and (2) the 
unnecessary crossing of experimental treatments would 
have reduced the analysis’s statistical power. We 
therefore crossed the two forms of institutional 
isomorphism using a 3x3 cross-factorial design, but did 
not cross the two factorial designs with each other. 
Consequently, we got 2x3 + 3x3 = 15 experimental 
treatments, with one experimental treatment included 
in both the factorial designs. This study therefore 
includes 14 experimental treatments. Appendix 9.1 
provides the details of all the experimental treatments.  
To collect data for each experimental treatment, we 
employed a counterbalanced within-subject 
experimental design for the following two reasons: 
first, each treatment represents one set of 
recommended items from which a participant could 
choose one recommended item. This relatively fast 
experimental task takes less than a minute to complete. 
Subjects could therefore participate in multiple 
treatments, which made a within-subject design 
feasible for our experiment. Second, the total of 14 
experimental treatments is relatively high. A between-
subject design would have required too many 
participants and was therefore not practically feasible.  
We used common approaches to reduce bias from 
carryover effects. In particular, we randomized the 
order of experimental treatments by using a Latin 
square design. However, since experience with 
experimental treatments did not help participants 
complete their tasks (i.e., answer the questions), the 
risk of carryover effects was already low. 
4.3 Sample, Scenario, and Task 
The experiment was conducted with 187 students at a 
public university. The group consisted of 91 graduate 
students specializing in business intelligence systems 
and 96 undergraduate students specializing in 
development and management of information 
systems. Detailed information about the sample is 
provided in Section 5.1 “Demographic Data” and in 
Appendix 9.2. Although the experiment was 
conducted in an organizational setting, students are 
suitable subjects, and students may also tend to be 
less biased than experienced professionals due to their 
general relative youth and lack of work experience.  
For our experiment, we provided participants with 
an organizational scenario. In this scenario, they 
assumed the role of Thomas, an employee at 
Contoso—i.e., an employee at the company introduced 
above for which the BIS provides data—who works in 
Contoso’s Sales Department in Germany.  
In the scenario, Thomas needs to complete nine tasks. 
Each task consists of one question that needs to be 
answered. All the questions focus on information in a 
specific report that the BIS has provided. To answer 
the questions correctly, Thomas needs to identify the 
relevant report and find the required information. For 
instance, one question could be: “To which income 
group does the customer with the customer key ‘19037’ 
belong?” Appendix 9.3.1 provides detailed information 
on all nine tasks, and Appendix 9.3.2 provides similar 
information on Contoso’s organizational structure.  
We used the following five techniques to train and 
prepare participants for the experiment: First, one 
week before the experiment took place, we provided 
participants with a 15-minute introductory video 
about the experiment. This video introduced them to 
the experiment, the scenario, and the usage of the BIS 
(including the ERA). Second, before the start of the 
experiment, the experiment instructor personally 
introduced participants to the scenario and the BIS, 
and demonstrated how to solve the first task. Third, 
we provided two training tasks to familiarize the 
participants with the role of Thomas and the BIS. 
Hence, the first two of the nine tasks were not 
considered in the data analysis. They were only used 
to familiarize participants with the role of Thomas 
and the BIS. Only tasks 3–9 were relevant for data 
analysis. Fourth, each participant received a reference 
paper illustrating Contoso’s organizational setting, 
thus precluding the need to remember Thomas’s role 
at Contoso and/or Contoso’s institutional or 
hierarchical structure. The reference paper is provided 
in Appendix 9.3.2. Fifth, during the experiment, the 
experiment instructor provided personal support in 
the use of the BIS if required by participants.  
The participants received a course credit for each 
task they answered correctly—excluding the training 
tasks 1 and 2—to motivate them to perform well. 
This was communicated to them, and they were also 
informed that the time they took to complete the 
tasks would not be considered.  
The participants could answer the tasks by either (1) 
browsing through the list of reports and then checking 
those they thought would provide relevant 
information, or by (2) using the ERA’s report 
recommendations. Table 3 shows the process for 
completing an experimental task. The participants 
were always given a set of three report 
recommendations, presented in turn (carousel effect). 
That is, every few seconds the recommendation 
changed to the next one, and after the third 
recommendation the first one appeared again.  
The recommendations were not dynamic, but 
predefined. All the report recommendations within 
the same set of three alternative recommendations 
always linked to the same report. However, the 
participants did not know this. Predefined 
recommendations were important, because the 
participants’ usage history would have influenced the 
recommended reports if dynamic recommendations 




were used. In turn, this could have affected the 
recommended reports’ usefulness, which could have 
affected how the users continued using the system.  
Each experimental treatment had three recommendations. 
After a participant had chosen one recommendation out of 
the set of three recommendations, all three 
recommendations were updated with the next 
experimental treatment’s recommendations.  
Furthermore, all sets of report recommendations were 
predefined because they represented our experimental 
treatments and thus had to be controlled. At the latest, 
the third set of recommendations forwarded 
participants to a report that gave them the information 
they needed to complete one experimental task. 
Consequently, we were able to gather data for up to 
three experimental treatments per experimental task.  
Finally, after completing the nine tasks, 
participants were asked to complete a 
postexperiment survey. All 187 experiment 
participants completed the postexperiment survey. 
 
 
Table 3. Exemplary Experimental Task  
Step  Description  
1. Entry page  
 
(each experimental task begins on the BIS entry page) 
In total, each participant receives nine tasks (two introductory 
tasks and seven that will be analyzed). Each task consists of a 
question that has to be answered (e.g., “How many female 
customers have a Bachelor’s degree?”). Throughout the task, 
this question is shown in the upper part of the screen.  
 
The participants enter their answer on the entry page (figure 
left). Once the answer has been entered, the next question is 
shown. In addition, the overview screen displays a list of 75 
reports.  
2.1 First report with first experimental treatment  
 
(report with ERA) 
 
(ERA uses the three recommendations in turn (carousel effect)) 
By clicking on a certain report, the selected report is shown 
(Figure 2). In addition, the ERA with a report recommendation 
is shown on the left side of the screen (Figure 2). This report 
recommendation changes every few seconds (carousel effect) 
and after the third recommendation, the first is again shown 
(figure left). Note that the report recommendations only indicate 
a previous user and do not provide a relevant description, name, 
or ID. 
  
Each set of three recommendations represents one experimental 
treatment. In Experimental Treatment 1, Recommendations 1 
and 3 always have the same degree of social influence (low). 
Recommendation 2 only differs in its degree of social influence. 
Our analysis thus focuses on the probability that 
Recommendation 2 will be chosen. We thus code our dependent 
variable as a binary variable: “click Recommendation 2” versus 
“click Recommendation 1 or 3”.  
 
Note: The use of the ERA is voluntary. Participants are not 
forced to use the report recommendations. The answers to the 
questions can also be found by examining the 75 reports one by 
one. The sample size differs slightly between the experimental 
treatments.  




Table 3. Exemplary Experimental Task  
2.2 More reports with more experimental treatments  
 
(the second report provides the second treatment; the third 
report provides the third treatment) 
After the participants have clicked on one of the three report 
recommendations, the next report (“Report 2”) is shown. It is 
important to note that all three report recommendations from the 
same experimental treatment always link to the same report. 
Therefore, it does not matter which report recommendation is 
chosen when answering the question. Note that the participants 
do not know this.  
 
The new report (“Report 2”) shows a new set of three report 
recommendations. This set of recommendations represents a 
new experimental treatment (“Treatment 2”). One experimental 
task can therefore examine multiple experimental treatments.  
4.4 Measurement of Recommendation 
Choice 
The recommendation choice is the dependent variable 
in our study. We anticipated that the probability of 
new users choosing a certain recommendation would 
change depending on the information provided about 
the previous users of recommended reports. 
Throughout the experiment, participants were able to 
select one of three recommendations or examine a list 
of all the reports.  
Since each set of three recommendations represents 
one experimental treatment, our analysis compares 
the probabilities of choosing a certain manipulated 
recommendation from different sets of (three) 
recommendations. Consequently, it was important to 
consistently present the manipulated recommendation 
in the same position throughout all the sets of 
recommendations in order to prevent the position of 
the manipulated recommendation from biasing 
results. For instance, some participants may have 
simply clicked on Recommendation 1, because it was 
the first recommendation they encountered.  
The manipulated recommendation was always shown 
as the second of three recommendations to avoid bias. 
In other words, by keeping the position of the 
manipulated recommendation constant across all 
experimental treatments (i.e., in all the treatments, the 
manipulated recommendation was shown in Position 
2), we can assume that the position of the 
manipulated recommendation does not exert a 
differential effect, thus ensuring that comparability 
of the experimental treatments.  
In contrast, a randomized approach would have 
limited such a comparison, because the participants 
wouldn’t have had to use the ERA. Consequently, 
randomizing the position of the manipulated 
recommendation is provided, would have likely led to 
some variation between the ratio of users who used 
the ERA and viewed the manipulated 
recommendation at Positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
For a certain treatment, for example, randomization 
could have caused 36% of ERA users to receive the 
manipulated recommendation as Recommendation 1, 
while, for another treatment, randomization may have 
caused only 30% of ERA users to receive the 
manipulated recommendation as Recommendation 1. 
Such a difference would have biased our results. 
Thus, instead of randomizing its position, the 
manipulated recommendation was always 
displayed as the second of three recommendations 
throughout the experimental treatments.  
Regarding the manipulated recommendation (i.e., 
Recommendation 2), the degree of social influence 
changed between the experimental treatments. 
Conversely, Recommendation 1 and 
Recommendation 3 always referred to a previous user 
with the same degree of social influence: A project 
manager not directly connected to Thomas who 
worked in a different department and a different 
continent than Thomas (see Appendix 9.1 for a 
detailed overview of all the experimental treatments).  
To collect data on the chosen recommendations, we 
logged the participants’ clicks on the 
recommendations. We determined the probability of 
the participants choosing a certain recommendation 
by computing the frequency of Recommendation 2 
being selected in each experimental treatment, 
divided by the frequency of any recommendation 
being selected in that experimental treatment (i.e., the 
sum of the clicks on Recommendations 1, 2, and 3). 
This ratio represented the probability of participants 
selecting Recommendation 2 in a specific 
experimental treatment. In turn, this probability 
allowed us to compare the effects of social influence 
because this only differed from the others in terms of 
Recommendation 2. Table 3 shows an example of the 
procedure in an experimental task. 
4.5 Measurement of Recommendation 
Elaboration 
To assess recommendation elaboration, we measured the 
extent to which users carefully considered 
recommendations. Since all recommendations were 




messages displayed on the screen, we measured the extent 
to which users cognitively processed these messages.  
While a vast literature has used questionnaires and 
surveys to measure elaboration, or has focused on the 
antecedents of elaboration (e.g., Angst & Agarwal, 2009; 
Bhattacherjee & Sanford, 2006; Ho & Bodoff, 2014), 
only Meservy, Jensen & Fadel (2014) demonstrate the 
benefits of eye tracking as a means of measuring 
elaboration. Contemporary eye-tracking devices provide 
multiple biometric metrics that can be aggregated to 
compute users’ fixation (i.e., gaze) on certain screen 
elements (Just & Carpenter, 1976; Loftus, 1972).  
In particular, state-of-the-art eye-tracking devices can 
measure users’ pupil size and, simultaneously, 
measure coordinate points on a screen that users look 
at. This makes it possible to compute the amount of 
time a user gazes at a message on a screen and is an 
important part of developing a reliable elaboration 
metric. In addition to gaze, users’ degree of cognitive 
processing can be computed by means of the collected 
pupil size metrics (Goldberg & Kotval, 1999; Weigle 
& Banks, 2014). Analysis of pupil sizes allowed us to 
determine whether users focused on and processed the 
displayed texts, or whether they merely moved their 
heads to skim the texts. Therefore, the product of 
coordination point metrics and pupil size metrics 
allowed us to compute a reliable fixation metric.  
To compute fixation, we used the fixation filter 
provided by the application ProStudio, because it is 
the recommended filter for our eye-tracking device 
Tobii Pro X2 (Tobii, 2015). This filter ensembles 
multiple fixation algorithms (Komogortsev, Gobert, 
Jayarathna, Koh, & Gowda, 2010; Rayner, Li, 
Williams, Cave, & Well, 2007; Over, Hooge, 
Vlaskamp, & Erkelens, 2007). Figure 2 above shows 
an example screen with the projection of fixation 
points (red dots). The size of the points represents the 
fixation length in milliseconds. 
4.6 Pretest  
A pretest with 26 participants was conducted two 
months prior to the main experiment to ensure that the 
manipulation of social cohesion, institutional 
isomorphism in terms of business function, 
institutional isomorphism in terms of location, and 
hierarchical power was successful and that the scenario 
and the experimental tasks were easy to understand. 
5 Data Analysis and Results 
This section first reports the experiment participants’ 
demographic data. This is followed by a description 
of the manipulation checks and the presentation of 
our hypothesis tests’ results. 
5.1 Demographic Data 
Appendix 9.1 summarizes the participants’ 
characteristics. More men (73%) participated than 
women (27%). The majority were between 21 and 29 
years old. As a cultural indicator, we asked them 
about their nationality and the first language they 
learned as a child. Overall, 57% of participants were 
German and 48% reported German as their first 
language. This is not surprising, since the study was 
conducted at a university in Germany. The other 
participants were from Arabic countries, China, 
Egypt, India, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Greece, 
Vietnam, and the USA. Other than the concentration 
of German participants, the demographic profile was 
fairly distributed across countries and cultures. 
5.2 Manipulation Checks 
We conducted manipulation checks for each 
experimental treatment, which are summarized in 
Table 4. We also administered a postexperiment 
survey, asking all the participants whether they had 
noticed that the four experimental treatments (social 
cohesion, institutional isomorphism in terms of 
business function, institutional isomorphism in terms 
of location, hierarchical power) differed among 
specific recommendations. We also added two general 
items to control for whether participants noticed that 
the recommendations always changed. Importantly, the 
items were phrased such that a consistent answer 
required the participant to answer one item with “yes” 
and the other item with “no” (see Table 4).  
167 of the 187 participants (89.3%) reported that they 
had noticed all the differences and answered the two 
additional items consistently (i.e., the first item with 
“yes” and second item with “no”). This is a large 
majority, which indicates a successful manipulation 
of the experimental treatments. 
5.3 Measurement Model  
Besides the manipulation checks, no variables in this 
study were measured by means of surveys. All the 
independent variables represented experimental 
treatments. Recommendation elaboration was 
measured by using gaze data (eye tracking) and the 
dependent variable was measured using log data of 
the BIS and the ERA. 
 
 




Table 4. Manipulation Checks for Experimental Treatments 
Experimental treatment  Postexperiment survey items  Ratio of positive 
(“yes”) answers 
Social cohesion  • I noticed that some recommendations were based on a 
direct colleague (e.g., my own intern or my supervising 
project manager), while other recommendations were 
based on less close colleagues. {yes, no}  
97.8%  
Institutional isomorphism in terms 
of business function  
• I noticed that the colleagues, who were shown in the 
report recommendations, worked in different 
departments. {yes, no}  
100.0%  
Institutional isomorphism in terms 
of location  
• I noticed that the countries of the colleagues shown in 
the report recommendations changed. {yes, no}  
98.3%  
Hierarchical power  • I noticed that the colleagues, who were shown in the 
report recommendations, were assigned to different 
hierarchical levels. {yes, no}  
98.9%  
Overall  • I noticed that recommendations changed. {yes, no}  98.9%  
• All recommendations were based on the same user. 
{yes, no} 
5.3%  
5.4 Results of Hypothesis Tests 
As described above, our experiment participants were 
asked to complete several tasks by answering 
questions. Each task consisted of exactly one 
question. We assumed that the participants would 
answer these questions correctly, because the 
recommended reports provided the information 
required to answer correctly.  
In the end, 93% of all questions were answered 
correctly. Regarding individual questions, this ratio 
ranged from 85% to 99%. The high ratio of correct 
answers indicates that the participants were motivated 
during the experiment and, as expected, were able to 
complete the tasks correctly. However, to avoid 
potential bias from unmotivated participants and/or 
guesses, our data analysis considered only the data of 
tasks completed correctly, i.e., tasks whose questions 
were answered correctly. We provide detailed 
information about all the tasks considered for the data 
analysis in Appendix 9.1; as well as a list of all the 
experimental treatments. Appendix 9.1 provides (a) 
the frequency with which a participant chose any 
recommendation out of a set of three and (b) the 
frequency with which a participant chose any 
recommendation out of a set of three and 
answered the question correctly.  
Since the manipulated recommendation (and thus the 
recommendation of interest) was always 
Recommendation 2 out of a set of three 
recommendations, the list also provides (c) the 
frequency with which a participant chose 
Recommendation 2 and answered the question 
correctly. This information allowed us to compute (d) 
the probability of the participants choosing 
Recommendation 2 if they chose one of the three 
recommendations and answered the question correctly.  
Overall, our results indicate that all the social nudges 
steered the users toward choosing a certain report 
recommendation. Changing the social influence of the 
recommended reports’ previous users increased the 
probability that BIS users would choose a certain 
recommendation. Figure 3 shows the mean values of 
the probability of choosing a certain recommendation. 





Figure 3. Mean Values of Probablility of Choosing a Certain Recommendation 
We conducted logistic linear mixed effects analysis, 
using the glmer() function of the statistical software 
package lme4 for R (version 1.1–12) (Bates, Mächler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2015). A logistic linear model was 
suitable, because we invoked linear effects and used 
one binary dependent variable (values: choose the 
manipulated recommendation; do not choose the 
manipulated recommendation). Similarly, a mixed 
effects analysis was suitable, because we 
administered a within-subject experiment (i.e., each 
participant was presented with multiple treatments).  
Table 5 and Table 6 present the results. As explained 
in Section 4.2, we used a 2x3 experiment design to 
test the effects of social cohesion, hierarchical power, 
and elaborated an additional 3x3 experiment design to 
test the effects of institutional isomorphism (in terms 
of business function), institutional isomorphism (in 
terms of location), and elaboration. Table 5 presents 
the results of social cohesion, hierarchical power, and 
elaboration (i.e., H1, H4, H5, H6a, H6d). Table 6 
presents the results of institutional isomorphism (in 
terms of business function), institutional isomorphism 
(in terms of location), and elaboration (i.e., H2, H3, 
H6b, H6c). To compare competing models (i.e., main 
models versus moderator models), we focus on 
information criteria statistics because we have 
multiple variables and information criteria impose 
penalties for including variables that do not 
significantly improve fit (Williams, 2017). 
Particularly with large samples, as in our case, 
information criteria can lead to more parsimonious 
but adequate models. Consistent with recent statistics 
literature (Müller, Scealy, Welsh, 2013), we report 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). AIC and BIC 
estimate the difference between the “true data” and a 
fitted model. Thus, the smaller their absolute values, 
the better the fit of the model. (Note: BIC penalizes 
model complexity more heavily. Müller et al. (2013). 
Our results show that the moderator models have 
greater fit than the respective main effect models 
because the AIC and BIC of the moderator models 
are smaller than the AIC and BIC of the main models.  
In addition, to provide pseudo R² statistics, we report 
the R² for general linear mixed models (so-called 
R²GLMM) following Nakagawa & Schielzeth (2013) 
and as implemented in the R package MuMIn version 
1.4 (Barton, 2017). Note that the R²GLMM aims to 
allow comparison of general linear mixed models and 
to represent an absolute value for the goodness-of-fit 
of a model (which is not yet given by the AIC or 
BIC). However, the R²GLMM needs to be assessed 
with caution if compared to R² statistics from linear 
models or general linear models (Nakagawa & 
Schielzeth, 2013). In line with the AIC and BIC, the 
R²GLMM values in study confirm that the moderator 
models significantly improve the fit of the model. 
Regarding the effects of social cohesion and 
hierarchical power, adding elaboration as a moderator 
increases the R²GLMM from 17.2% to 42.3%. 




Similarly, regarding the effect of institutional 
isomorphism, adding elaboration as moderator 
increases the R²GLMM from 9.5% to 24.3%. (Note: 
We do not distinguish between R²GLMM for the fixed-
effects model and the entire model because differences 
only occurred after the fourth relevant digit.)  
5.4.1 Table 5 and Table 6: Interpretation of 
Estimates (= Log Odds) and Odds Ratio  
Estimates represent the log odds factor according to 
which the probability of choosing the manipulated 
recommendation changes in contrast to the baseline 
model (i.e., low social cohesion and low hierarchical 
power). Example: In the logistic linear mixed-effects 
model, high social cohesion (rather than low social 
cohesion) increases this probability by a factor of 
1.280 log odds. We also show the odds ratio to 
facilitate interpretation further. Example: A factor of 
1.280 log odds in a logistic linear model would reflect 
an e^1.280 = 3.596 odds ratio change. In other words, 
the probability increases by a factor of 3.596 if the 
social cohesion is high in contrast to the baseline 
model, which has low social cohesion. 
 




Table 5. Logistic Linear Mixed-Effects Model of The Effects of Social Cohesion, Hierarchical Power and 
Recommendation Elaboration on the Recommendation Choice 
Main model (AIC=1248.6, BIC=1278.0, R²GLMM=17.2%):  
Fixed effects  Estimate Odds ratio Std. error z value Pr(>|z|) Hyp. 
Intercept  -1.042 0.353 0.157 -6.623 3.51E-11 ***  
Social cohesion 
[high]  1.280 3.596 0.141 9.085 2.00E-16 *** H1 
Hier. power 
[medium]  0.070 1.072 0.169 0.412 0.681 H4 
Hier. power 
[high]  1.039 2.826 0.187 5.543 2.97E-08 *** H4 
Elaboration  0.091 1.095 0.056 1.626 0.104  
Random effects  Var. Std. dev. Observations Groups   
Subject 
(Intercept)  0 0 999 175   
Residuals  Min. 1Q Median 3Q Max . 
Residuals  -2.083 0.685 -0.594 0.858 1.684  
Moderator model (AIC=1125.2, BIC=1189.0, R²GLMM=42.3%):  
Fixed effects  Estimate Odds ratio Std. error z value Pr(>|z|) Hyp. 
Intercept  -0.739 0.478 0.259 -2.857 0.004 **  
Social cohesion 
[high]  1.138 3.120 0.352 3.230 0.001  **  
Hier. power 
[medium]  0.389 1.476 0.310 1.255 0.209  
Hier. power 
[high]  0.727 2.068 0.363 2.000 0.046  *  


























[med.] * Elab.  
1.743 5.714 0.422 4.128 3.65E-05 ***  
 




Table 6. Logistic Linear Mixed-Effects Model of the Effects of Institutional Isomorphism and Recommendation 
Elaboration on the Recommendation Choice  
Main model (AIC=1990.6, BIC=2027.9, R²GLMM=9.5%):  
Fixed effects  Estimate Odds ratio Std. error z value Pr(>|z|) Hyp. 
Intercept  -0.973 0.3780 0.113 -8.640 2.00E-16 ***  
Inst. isomorphism in terms of 
business funct. [medium]  
0.828 2.289 0.131 6.319 2.63E-10 *** H2 
Inst. isomorphism in terms of 
business funct. [high]  
1.004 2.728 0.130 7.711 1.25E-14 *** H2 
Inst. isomorphism in terms of 
location [medium]  
0.068 1.071 0.134 0.509 0.610451 H3 
Inst. isomorphism in terms of 
location [high]  
0.468 1.596 0.141 3.307 0.000943 *** H3 
Elaboration  0.119 1.126 0.041 2.871 0.004092 **  
Random effects  Var. Std. dev. Observations Groups   
Subject (Intercept)  0 0 1513 179   
Residuals  Min. 1Q Median 3Q Max.  
Residuals  -1.618 -0.930 -0.615 0.910 1.627  
Moderator model (AIC=1888.6, BIC=1989.8, R²GLMM=24.3%):  
Fixed effects  Estimate Odds ratio Std. error z value Pr(>|z|) Hyp. 
Intercept  -0.349 0.705 0.172 -2.038 0.042 *  
Inst. isomorphism in terms of 
business funct. [medium]  
-0.031 0.969 0.290 -0.107 0.915  
Inst. isomorphism in terms of 
business funct. [high]  
-0.153 0.858 0.284 -0.539 0.590  
Inst. isomorphism w.r.t. location 
[medium]  
-0.300 0.741 0.298 -1.006 0.315  
Inst. isomorphism in terms of 
location [high]  
1.206 2.790 0.384 2.672 0.008 **  
Elaboration  -0.796 0.451 0.165 -4.807 1.53E-06 ***  
Inst. isomorph. (bf)[med.] * Inst. 
isomorph. (loc) [med.]  
0.648 1.913 0.481 1.348 0.178  
Inst. isomorph. (bf) [high] * Inst. 
isomorph. (loc) [med.]  
0.241 1.273 0.474 0.509 0.611  
Inst. isomorph. (bf) [med.] * Inst. 
isomorph.(loc)[high]  
-1.801 0.165 0.697 -2.582 0.010 **  
Table 5. Logistic Linear Mixed-Effects Model of The Effects of Social Cohesion, Hierarchical Power and 




[high] * Elab.  
1.106 3.021 0.475 2.328 0.020 *  
Random effects  Variance Std. dev. Observations Groups   
Subject 
(Intercept)  0 0 999 175   
Residuals  Min. 1Q Median 3Q Max.  
Residuals  -3.090 -0.716 -0.201 0.819 6.084  
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. 




Table 6. Logistic Linear Mixed-Effects Model of the Effects of Institutional Isomorphism and Recommendation 
Elaboration on the Recommendation Choice  
Inst. isomorph. (bf) [high] * Inst. 
isomorph.(loc)[high]  
-1.698 0.183 0.656 -2.589 0.010 **  
Inst. iso. (bf)[med.] * Elab.  1.490 4.438 0.261 5.719 1.07E-08 *** H6b 
Inst. iso. (bf) [high] * Elab.  1.609 4.999 0.256 6.292 3.13E-10 *** H6b 
Inst. iso.(loc)[med.] * Elab.  0.846 2.329 0.202 4.179 2.92E-05*** H6c 
Inst. iso. (loc)[high] * Elab.  0.444 1.559 0.219 2.025 0.043 * H6c 
Inst. isom. (bf) [med.] * Inst. 
isom.(loc)[med] * Elab  
-1.475 0.229 0.307 -4.809 1.52E-06 ***  
Inst. isom. (bf) [high] * Inst. 
isom.(loc)[med] * Elab  
-1.222 0.295 0.308 -3.963 7.40E-05 ***  
Inst. isom. (bf) [med.] * Inst. 
isom.(loc)[high] * Elab  
-0.530 0.589 0.356 -1.488 0.137  
Inst. isom. (bf) [high] * Inst. 
isom.(loc)[high] * Elab  
-0.444 0.629 0.350 -1.327 0.185  
Random effects  Variance Std. dev. Observations Groups   
Subject (Intercept)  0 0 1513 179   
Residuals  Min. 1Q Median 3Q Max.  
Residuals  -2.788 -0.840 -0.193 0.912 6.084  
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. 
All the computed models’ statistical results indicate 
that the residuals vary around a slightly negative 
median (between -0.2 and -0.6), that the first 
quantile varies between -0.9 and -0.7, and the third 
quantile between 0.7 and 0.9. However, the random 
effect (i.e., the variance explained by a certain 
participant or “subject”) is approximately zero in all 
the computed models. This estimate by glmer() 
indicates that the residual term alone explains the 
extent of the subject variation (Barr et al., 2013). 
The variation between the participants is too small 
to add an additional random effect estimate.  
While Figure 3 above shows the direct effects (H1–
4), Figures 4a–d below show the moderation effects 
of recommendation elaboration (H6a–d), and Figure 5 
visualizes the interaction effect between social 
cohesion and hierarchical power (H5). The following 
subsections explain the statistical and graphical 
results of all the hypotheses individually. 
 
 
Figure 4a–b. Moderating Effects of Recommendation Elaboration 
 





Figure 4c–d. Moderating Effects of Recommendation Elaboration 
 
Figure 5. Interaction Effect Between Social Cohesion and Hierarchical Power 
5.4.2 The Effects of Social Nudges Based on 
Social Cohesion and Hierarchical 
Power 
As shown in Figure 3, each of the four social nudges 
increased the probability of the participants choosing 
a certain recommendation. The probability of a 
participant choosing a certain recommendation was 
significantly higher if the recommendation was based 
on the usage data of a direct colleague (i.e., high 
social cohesion), who was referred to, for example, as 
“your project manager” instead of “a project 
manager.” Since this increase was also statistically 
significant at p<0.001, it provides evidence for H1. 
Specifically, the mixed-effects model in Table 5 
(main-effects model) indicates that participants chose 
recommendations with high levels of social cohesion 
3.6 times more often than they chose those with low 
levels of social cohesion.  




In addition, we suggested that the probability of a 
participant choosing a certain recommendation would 
also be significantly higher if the previous user of the 
recommended report were assigned to a hierarchically 
more powerful position, such as a director or a project 
manager (H4). However, only a truly high 
hierarchical power level (“director”) increased the 
probability significantly (at p<0.001). Compared to 
the low hierarchical power level (“intern”), the 
medium hierarchical power level (“project manager”) 
only increased the probability by a factor of 1.1, 
while the high hierarchical power level (“director”) 
increased the probability by a factor of 2.8. This 
indicates that a social nudge based on hierarchical 
power is generally suitable for influencing users’ 
actions, but that the effect size varies strongly.  
We found that employees in powerful positions, such 
as directors, can influence other employees even if 
they are not directly connected to them (H5). 
However, the opposite does not seem to hold true. 
Employees in less powerful hierarchical positions, 
such as interns, can usually only influence directly 
connected employees. In contrast to employees in 
highly powerful positions, such as directors, who can 
influence all employees, interns are unlikely to 
influence employees with whom they do not have any 
ties. Consequently, nudges based on low-power 
employees will benefit far more from social cohesion.  
H5 defined this interaction effect between 
hierarchical power and social cohesion. Our results 
support H5. Figure 5 indicates that recommendations 
based on users with high hierarchical power will 
benefit very little from social cohesion (i.e., slight 
slope along the social cohesion dimension in Figure 
5). However, recommendations based on users with 
only medium or even low hierarchical power will 
benefit strongly if the social cohesion between users 
is high (i.e., steep slope along the social cohesion 
dimension in Figure 5). The mixed-effects model also 
shows statistical significance at p<0.001 in terms of this 
interaction effect (Table 5, moderating-effects model). 
5.4.3 The Effects of Social Nudges Based on 
Institutional Isomorphism 
Furthermore, we designed two nudges based on 
institutional isomorphism. The results show that 
institutional isomorphism in terms of a user’s 
business function (H2) increased the probability of 
that user choosing a specific recommendation. In 
contrast to low similarity between two business 
functions (e.g., a sales department and an IT 
department), medium similarity (e.g., a sales 
department and a marketing department) increased 
the probability by a factor of 2.3, while high 
similarity (e.g., two sales departments) increased the 
probability by a factor of 2.7 (Table 6, main-effects 
model). Both increases were statistically significant at 
p<0.001, which supports H2. 
However, as can be seen in Figure 3, the effect size of 
the social nudge based on institutional isomorphism is 
smaller in terms of a user’s location (H3). In contrast 
to users’ locations on different continents (e.g., 
Germany and Canada), locations on the same 
continent (e.g., Germany and France) only increased 
the probability by a factor of 1.1, while locations 
within the same country (e.g., two locations in 
Germany) only increased the probability by a factor 
of 1.6 (Table 6, main-effects model). While this 
increase was still statistically significant at p<0.001, 
which supports H3, it is interesting to note that, in our 
study, institutional isomorphism in terms of user 
business function had a much larger impact than 
institutional isomorphism in terms of user location. 
5.4.4 The Moderating Effect of 
Recommendation Elaboration 
We suggested that the effect of any nudge depends on 
whether participants elaborate and choose a 
recommendation, or whether they merely click on one 
without processing it cognitively. As described above, 
we used an eye tracker to measure recommendation 
elaboration. We identified five relevant elaboration 
intervals to analyze recommendation elaboration: 0 
seconds (i.e., no elaboration), 0.1 to 1 second, 1.1 to 2 
seconds, 2.1 to 3 seconds, and 3.1 seconds or more. The 
plots of H6a–d in Figures 4a–d visualize the effects of 
these elaboration intervals on all the experimental 
treatments. Furthermore, Appendix 9.4 provides detailed 
information about all the combinations of elaboration 
intervals and experimental treatments.  
The interaction plots support the directions of H6a–d. 
The probability of the participants choosing the 
manipulated recommendation increases with high 
levels of social influence (e.g., high social cohesion). 
However, the probability does not decrease with low 
levels of social influence (e.g., low social cohesion). 
Specifically, it can be noted that the probabilities of 
no elaboration (0 seconds) and low elaboration (0.1 to 
1 second) are similar. As soon as elaboration 
increases, our nudges’ effects become visible. This 
supports our assumption that people need to 
cognitively process a recommendation aimed at 
nudging them. Regarding the statistical significance 
of these results, our mixed-effects models (Table 5 
and Table 6, moderating-effects model) show that 
H6b–d are significant. Only H6a is not significant. 
5.4.5 Control Model 
The hypotheses analyzed above represent the main 
research model. We analyzed the effect of potentially 
biasing factors. Our analysis controlled for the 
participants’ age, gender, nationality, and their culture 




(measured as first language). However, none of these 
control variables had any significant influence on our 
main research model (Appendix 9.5, Table 12 and 
Table 13). We therefore conclude that the experiment 
participants’ age, gender, nationality, and/or culture 
do not bias our results. 
6 Discussion 
Our findings provide important insights for improving 
the reuse of reports, as well as for designing social 
nudges in the context of BIS. The findings shed light 
on how individuals’ recommendation elaboration 
determines the influence of RAs and, thus, the 
influence of recommendations that provide additional 
information to steer users toward specific choices. 
6.1 Implications for Theory 
6.1.1 A Novel Approach for Managing Core 
BIS and Supplementary WS 
Our study describes a new approach for tackling the 
challenges of workaround systems (WS), such as the 
limited reuse of information, poor decision-making 
based on inconsistent data, and loss of synergies 
across employees. The idea behind our approach is that 
large BIS should proactively reduce individuals’ need 
to develop and use WS. We therefore proposed and 
examined an enterprise recommendation agent (ERA) 
that extends existing BIS. This ERA reduces 
individuals’ need to develop and use WS that store 
individuals’ reports, because it facilitates the retrieval 
of relevant existing reports. Specifically, the ERA uses 
social nudges to motivate individuals to use report 
recommendations and, thus, increase report reuse.  
While previous literature has focused on BIS 
governance in order to tackle the challenges of WS, 
the ERA focuses on facilitating information reuse. 
The ERA supports BIS users’ search for potentially 
relevant reports. According to Simon’s (1957) 
decision-making process, individuals first need to 
identify relevant choices and thereafter select the 
most suitable option. Meservy et al. (2014) show that 
this process also holds in the IS context. Thus, by 
suggesting that candidates should report to BIS users, 
the ERA supports their report reuse decisions. The 
ERA helps users identify potentially relevant reports, 
and thus facilitates the reuse of reports originally 
developed by their colleagues. Ultimately, this should 
reduce individuals’ need to develop WS, because they 
will find existing reports with the required 
information more often. The ERA thus helps increase 
the reuse of BIS reports and reduce the use of WS.  
The existing literature offers approaches focusing on 
IS governance to manage and balance the use of large 
enterprise IS and WS (Alter, 2014). The ERA 
proposed in this study complements these approaches, 
because the downsides of these IS governance-based 
approaches do not affect it. Most IS governance-
based approaches emphasize either the need to 
prevent WS or the need to acknowledge the value of 
WS and the importance of helping individuals build 
WS. However, both approaches have their limitations. 
Attempts to control the use of large enterprise IS and 
prevent WS have been shown to lead to shadow 
systems (Alter, 2013, 2014; Behrens, 2009; Sun, 
2012). Similarly, the value of empowering individuals 
is also limited. If organizations foster the 
development of WS, the complexity of the overall IS 
environment inevitably increases and must be 
managed, usually through additional IS governance 
units. However, establishing and running these 
organizational units is very costly and only the 
specific context can determine whether introducing 
additional IS governance units will increase the 
flexibility of IS (Brown & Magill, 1994, 1998; 
Gebauer & Schober, 2006; Tiwana & Kim, 2015). In 
contrast to these IS governance-based approaches, our 
ERA neither limits individuals’ flexibility in terms of 
using existing information, nor does it require 
additional governance units to manage increasingly 
complex IS environments. The ERA is therefore a 
valuable complement to existing approaches for 
managing core BIS and supplementary WS. 
6.1.2 Design and Evaluation of Social Nudges 
Individuals’ decision-making is not entirely rational. 
Numerous cognitive biases may influence their 
attempts to make rational decisions. Extant literature 
has showed that these biases also exist in the IS 
context (e.g., Adomavicius, Bockstedt, Curley, & 
Zhang, 2013; Allen & Parsons, 2010; Goes; 2013). 
However, empirical IS studies have not examined 
how additional information about previous users can 
be used to exert a social influence on new users and, 
thus, steer them toward making certain desirable 
choices. We address this gap by designing and 
evaluating four social nudges.  
Social psychologists and behavioral economists use 
the notion of a nudge to refer to a change in the way 
different options are presented (without affecting the 
options themselves) in order to promote desirable 
choices (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). A frequently 
mentioned example of a nudge is a picture of a 
smoker’s lungs on a pack of cigarettes (Sunstein, 
2014). Although the picture does not force smokers to 
stop smoking, it influences their choices. In other 
words, the picture of the smoker’s lungs nudges 
(potential) smokers and influences their decisions in 
desirable ways (e.g., to quit smoking). Adapting the 
nudge concept to the IS concept, we introduced the 
notion of social nudges. In line with the nudge 
literature (Halpern, 2015; Sunstein, 2014), a social 
nudge is a nudge that uses the effects of social 
influence to promote desirable choices. Compared to 




pictures showing the adverse health effects of certain 
activities, social influence is far more relevant in the 
enterprise IS context and, thus, in the BIS context.  
We present four social nudges based on three 
different forms of social influence in organizations: 
social influence based on proximity between 
individuals (i.e., social cohesion), social influence 
based on similar positions in organizational settings 
(i.e., institutional isomorphism) in terms of business 
function and location, and social influence based on 
the power in organizational hierarchies. Our results 
indicate that providing additional information about 
previous users may exert a social influence on new 
users, which would then increase the probability of 
these new users choosing a specific recommendation.  
By demonstrating the concrete application of social 
nudges, this study motivates further IS research that 
would aim to explore ways of utilizing cognitive 
biases in order to promote desired user behaviors. 
While the vast body of works by behavioral 
economists theorizes deeply on the potential benefits 
of nudges (e.g., Hanna, 2015), IS research can 
contribute by refining and designing concrete nudges 
and by demonstrating and testing their effects. 
6.1.3 Effect of Recommendation Elaboration 
As a third theoretical implication, this study reveals 
how an individual’s recommendation elaboration 
shapes the effect that a recommendation agent (RA) 
has on a user. We operationalized users’ 
recommendation elaboration as their fixation on the 
recommendation agent and used eye-tracking devices 
to measure this fixation measure. The results 
demonstrate that, without recommendation 
elaboration, users’ recommendation choice is random 
and not influenced by additionally provided 
information about a recommendation. Consequently, 
social nudges that provide additional information 
about previous users’ influences do not affect the 
recommendation choice in the absence of elaboration.  
The results of examining recommendation elaboration 
indicate that just 1 to 2 seconds of recommendation 
elaboration allowed the designed social nudges to 
influence individuals’ recommendation choices. This 
finding indicates that even very little elaboration is 
influential, which addresses calls for research on 
recommendation timing (e.g., Ho, Bodoff, & Tam, 
2011). Finally, the effect of recommendation 
elaboration could also be very interesting for other IS 
research and marketing domains that attempt to 
optimize the frequency with which display 
advertisements are updated (e.g., Balseiro, Feldman, 
Mirrokni, & Muthukrishnan, 2014). 
6.2 Implications for Practice 
Besides implications for theory, our findings offer 
interesting insights for managers, IS designers, IS 
developers, and RA designers. First, we present a 
novel approach for managing the trade-off between 
core BIS and supplementary WS. That is, we propose 
an ERA to increase the reuse of BIS reports. Higher 
report reuse generates synergies across employees. It 
reduces data inconsistencies, which in turn improves 
managers’ decision-making. In contrast to other 
approaches, the proposed ERA targets report reuse 
without restricting user authorizations and without 
requiring expensive IS governance units. In addition, 
this study designed and tested four social nudges, 
using information about reports’ previous users. This 
information included a proximity indicator (“a” vs. 
“your”), previous users’ department and country, as 
well as their role in their organizations’ hierarchies. 
These information chunks are concrete examples of 
social nudges in an enterprise IS context and provide 
useful guidelines for IS designers and developers.  
Finally, our findings provide two interesting insights 
for RA designers. First, the proposed ERA indicates a 
new context for which RAs could be designed and 
developed. In addition, our findings indicate that RA 
designers need to take care when building RAs that 
update their recommendations after certain time 
intervals. Our experiment showed that most users 
required 1–3 seconds to process a small amount of 
additional information about the recommendations. 
However, since this finding may be highly context 
and RA-dependent, we recommend that RAs be tested 
within their specific contexts in order to determine 
suitable recommendation update frequencies. 
6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for 
Future Research 
Despite its contributions to theory and practice, our 
study has limitations and also creates opportunities 
for future research. To begin with, we focused on 
nudges in the context of BIS. Although BIS are a 
common context in the IS research domain, the 
generalizability of our results should also be 
examined in other contexts. We conducted a lab 
experiment for two main reasons. First, the lab 
experiment allowed us to control for external effects. 
In a field setting, controlling for social influence 
would have been almost impossible because of the 
numerous potentially confounding factors (e.g., 
experience working together, trust, looks, etc.). 
Second, the lab experiment allowed us to conduct 
fixation analysis and, thus, reliably measure 
recommendation elaboration. However, a future 
study could build on our findings and test our 
hypotheses in a field setting.  




Next, choosing students as the experiment 
participants may have reduced our findings’ 
generalizability to employees within organizations. 
However, although students do not have extensive 
experience working with BIS, we argue that they are 
a reasonably representative group, and also that 
external factors such as age and experience likely 
cause them to be less biased than some other groups 
(e.g., Choi, Jiang, Xiao, & Kim, 2015; Colquitt, 2008; 
Xu et al., 2014). To mitigate the risk associated with 
inexperienced participants, we used only tabular 
reports and very basic and intuitive functionalities 
and tasks (e.g., open a report from a list, open a 
recommended report, filter a report, and look for 
certain information within a report). We used several 
techniques to train the participants to use the BIS (i.e., 
introduction video, personal introduction, personal 
support, training tasks, and reference papers) and 
after the experiment, we did not find any indication 
that the participants had had difficulties using the 
BIS. The number of correctly completed experimental 
tasks (93%) also supports this assumption.  
Finally, a third limitation relates to the measurement of 
elaboration, which we measured using state-of-the-art 
eye-tracking technology for each recommendation. 
However, since eye-tracking devices constantly 
improve, future studies could leverage, for instance, a 
more granular resolution. This would allow researchers 
to provide detailed elaboration measurements of the 
subparts of the recommendations.  
Besides tackling these potential limitations, future 
research could extend our work and also design and 
investigate other nudges. We focused on social 
nudges due to the significance of social influence on 
individuals’ behaviors in organizations (Tichy et al., 
1979; Tsai & Goshal, 1998). However, IS user 
behaviors could perhaps be manipulated by means 
other than social effects and future studies could thus 
investigate similar nudges that leverage other 
cognitive biases (Goes, 2013). From a practitioner’s 
perspective, future research could also extend our 
ERA by adding concrete information about the 
recommended reports. For instance, report 
recommendations could be extended with short 
descriptions indicating why other colleagues use 
the reports. These studies could specifically 
improve our ERA, because, in its current form, it 
focuses only on presenting information about 
previous users without considering information 
about the content of the recommended reports. 
7 Conclusion 
Recent IS articles have called on researchers to draw 
on and contribute to behavioral economists’ research 
(Goes 2013). This study draws on their nudge 
concept. We offer a specific refinement described as a 
social nudge, which refers to the attempt to steer an 
individual toward desirable choices by exploiting the 
effect of social influence on the individual. However, 
in line with the nudge concept, a social nudge should 
not change the range of available options from which 
an individual can choose.  
We designed four social nudges based on theoretical 
knowledge about social cohesion, institutional 
isomorphism, and hierarchical power, and 
mplemented them to examined their effects on BIS 
users. Our findings show that the four 
implementations of social nudges steered users 
toward making the targeted choices. These findings 
are interesting for IS researchers and behavioral 
economists because they offer insights into concrete 
applications and the effects of the nudge concept.  
We examined the effects of the four social nudges in 
the context of RAs. Previous RA literature has 
focused on end consumers rather than employees as 
RA users. However, we argue that RAs should also 
be considered potential extensions of enterprise IS. 
We therefore proposed an enterprise recommendation 
agent (ERA) as an extension of BIS and showed that 
an ERA can complement existing approaches to 
managing core BIS and supplementary WS. 
Specifically, an ERA can facilitate information 
retrieval and thus increase reuse of existing 
information and reports. Since this reduces 
employees’ needs to build redundant and duplicate 
reports using WS, the ERA represents a means for 
better balancing core BIS and supplementary WS. 
Finally, we also contribute to RA literature and 
elaboration research by empirically examining and 
reliably quantifying the effects of users’ 
recommendation elaboration by using recent eye- 
tracking technology and conducting gaze analysis. 
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A1. Experimental Treatments and Probabilities  
We used a within-subject experimental design. Experimental treatments 1–9 were used for the cross-factorial 
examination of institutional isomorphism in terms of business function and location. Experimental treatments 10–15 
were used for the cross-factorial examination of social cohesion and hierarchical power. Note, in treatments 10 and 
11, the hierarchical position of the user referred to in Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 3 is “intern,” 
because, Recommendation 2 would otherwise have referred to users with a lower social influence than 
Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 3.  
In total, 187 subjects participated in our experiment. However, since we did not want to force them to select a 
recommendation, some participants solved the experimental task without choosing any of the three provided report 
recommendations. The actual sample size N of each experimental treatment is therefore less than 187. Specifically, it 
ranges from 149 to 171.  
Note that one experimental treatment is included in both of the cross-factorial designs. Experimental Treatment 1 and 
Experimental Treatment 12 are the same. Consequently, the sample size of these treatments is approximately twice 
the sample size of the other treatments.  
Table 7 provides all experimental treatments. Table 8 shows (a) the frequency with which a participant followed any 
recommendation from a set of three, and (b) the frequency with which a user followed any recommendation from a 
set of three and answered the task correctly. Since the manipulated recommendation (and thus the recommendation 
of interest) is always the second from a set of three “rotating” recommendations, the list also provides (c) the 
frequency with which a user followed the second recommendation and completed the task correctly. Finally, this 
allowed us to compute (d) the probability of users selecting the second recommendation if they followed one of the 
three recommendations of the condition and answered the task correctly.  
Note that the number of observations in Table 5 and Table 6 corresponds to the sum of Column (b) in Table 8. 
Specifically, the number of observations (1513) in the models estimating the effects of social cohesion, power, and 
elaboration equals the sum of Table 8, Column (b), Rows 1–9. In contrast, the number of observations (999) in the 
models estimating the effects of institutional isomorphism (in terms of business function and location) and 
elaboration equals the sum of Table 8, Column (b), Rows 10–15. 
Table 7. Experimental Treatments: Overview.  
Exp. treatment 
ID 
Inst. isomorph. in terms of 
business function 








1 different different low medium (314) 
2 different similar low medium 160 
3 different same low medium 168 
4 similar different low medium 152 
5 similar similar low medium 163 
6 similar same low medium 153 
7 same different low medium 171 
8 same similar low medium 161 
9 same same low medium 166 
10 different different low low 150 
11 different different high low 149 
12 (=1) different different low medium (314) 
13 different different high medium 158 
14 different different low high 158 
15 different different high high 156 




Table 8. Experimental Treatments: Analysis.  
Exp. treatment 
ID (a) N 
(b) N with correctly 
answered question 
(c) Recommendation 2 
chosen 
(d) Probability of 
choosing 
Recommendation 2 
1 (314) (297) (78) 26,26% 
2 160 150 54 36,00% 
3 168 155 75 48,39% 
4 152 147 82 55,78% 
5 163 159 84 52,83% 
6 153 140 85 60,71% 
7 171 155 86 55,48% 
8 161 146 83 56,85% 
9 166 164 113 68,90% 
10 150 141 37 26,24% 
11 149 126 75 59,52% 
12 (=1) (314) (297) (78) 26,26% 
13 158 141 96 68,09% 
14 158 153 94 61,44% 
15 156 141 101 71,63% 
 
A2. Demographic Data 
Table 9. Demographic Data 
Category Value Absolute Percentage 
Participants na 187 100.00% 
Sex 
Men 136 72.73% 
Women 51 27.27% 
Total 187 100.00% 
Age 
17 or younger  1  0.53%  
18–20  47  25.13%  
21-29  135  72.19%  
30–39  4  2.14%  
40–49  0  0.00%  
50–59  0  0.00%  
60 or older  0  0.00%  
Total  187  100.00%  
Nationality 
Albanian  4  2.14%  
Belarus  1  0.53%  
Bolivian  1  0.53%  
Bulgarian  3  1.60%  
Chinese  12  6.42%  
Colombian  2  1.07%  
Dutch  1  0.53%  
Egyptian  4  2.14%  




Table 9. Demographic Data 
French  1  0.53%  
German  106  56.68%  
Greek  4  2.14%  
Hungarian  1  0.53%  
Indian  6  3.21%  
Iraqi  1  0.53%  
Italian  3  1.60%  
Jordanian  1  0.53%  
Korean (Republic)  2  1.07%  
Lithuanian  1  0.53%  
Mexican  2  1.07%  
Moroccan  1  0.53%  
Norwegian  1  0.53%  
Pakistan  1  0.53%  
Peruvian  1  0.53%  
Romanian  1  0.53%  
Russian  5  2.67%  
Spanish  4  2.14%  
Suisse  1  0.53%  
Swedish  2  1.07%  
Syrian  1  0.53%  
Turkish  6  3.21%  
US American  3  1.60%  
Vietnamese  4  2.14%  
Total  187  100.00%  
First language as a child 
Albanian  4  2.14%  
Arabic  8  4.28%  
Bulgarian  3  1.60%  
Cantonese  2  1.07%  
Chechen  1  0.53%  
Chinese  11  5.88%  
Dutch  1  0.53%  
English  2  1.07%  
German  90  48.13%  
Greek  3  1.60%  
Hindi  2  1.07%  
Hungarian  1  0.53%  
Italian  3  1.60%  
Korean  2  1.07%  
Lithuanian  2  1.07%  
Norwegian  1  0.53%  
Romanian  3  1.60%  
Russian  11  5.88%  




Table 9. Demographic Data 
Serbian  1  0.53%  
Shanghainese  1  0.53%  
Slovak  1  0.53%  
Spanish  10  5.35%  
Swedish  2  1.07%  
Tamil  2  1.07%  
Telugu  2  1.07%  
Turkish  11  5.88%  
Urdu  1  0.53%  
Vietnamese  6  3.21%  
Total  187  100.00%  
 
A3. Experiment Design 
A3.1Experimental Tasks 
The experiment participants were asked to complete nine tasks. Each task consists of one question, which they could 
answer by searching for specific information in the BIS and using the ERA and/or the list of all reports. The time 
needed to answer a question was not measured and participants were informed about this before the experiment. 
Table 10 provides the list of all tasks. Note that task 1 and task 2 were used as training tasks. 
Table 10. List of experimental tasks.  
Task Type Question Answer 
1  Training  Where does the customer come from who placed the order with the number 
200701011CS567?  
United Kingdom  
2  Training  What is the product subcategory of order number 20070101311515?  Computers 
Accessories  
3  Experiment  How many male customers have 5 children and own a house 
(HouseOwnerFlag=1)? [count rows]  
2  
4  Experiment  How many Contoso Carrying Case E312 Silver were ordered in the year 2007? 
[count the rows]  
4  
5  Experiment  What is the gender and customer key of the customer with the highest 
consumption?  
M and 178  
6  Experiment  What is the yearly income of customer 137?  40.000,00  
7  Experiment  How many female customers have a Bachelor’s degree? [count rows]  6  
8  Experiment  In which country does customer 343 place his orders?  France  
9  Experiment  Where does customer 252 live and how old is he/she?  83 and Canada  




A4. Organizational Structure of Contoso  
The departments, org. hierarchy, and regions in which Contoso operates are displayed in Figure 6. Figure 6 was also 
printed and given to all the participants during the experiment. 
 
Figure 6. Contoso Reference Paper Provided to Participants During the Experiment. 
 
  




A5. Recommendation Elaboration Analysis 
Recommendation elaboration was measured using Tobii Pro X2 (Tobii, 2015) eye-tracking devices. A detailed 
description of this measure is provided in Section 4.5. To visualize the effects of recommendation elaboration, we 
defined five intervals and computed the probabilities that participants would choose the manipulated 
recommendation, i.e., Recommendation 2. The results are illustrated in Figures 4a–d in Section 5.4. Table 11 below 
provides detailed probabilities. Related statistical analyses and significance tests of H6a–d are presented in Table 5 
and Table 6 in Section 5.4.  
 
Table 11. Probabilities to Choose Manipulated Recommendation by Rec. Elaboration 
                                                    Elaboration [sec] 
 Probability 0.0s 0.1–1.0s 1.1–2.0s 2.1–3.0s 3.1s–inf 
Recommendation elaboration and social cohesion:  
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if 
social cohesion was high  0.47 0.56 0.72 0.86 0.97 
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if 
social cohesion was low  0.42 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.31 
Recommendation elaboration and institutional isomorphism in terms of business function:  
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if the 
business function was the same  0.37 0.44 0.55 0.72 0.82 
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if the 
business function was similar  0.43 0.47 0.59 0.60 0.65 
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if the 
business function differed  0.40 0.38 0.37 0.27 0.24 
Recommendation elaboration and institutional isomorphism in terms of location:  
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if 
location was the same  0.39 0.48 0.57 0.61 0.64 
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if the 
location was similar  0.40 0.40 0.49 0.55 0.56 
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if the 
location differed  0.40 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.40 
Recommendation elaboration and hierarchical power:  
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if the 
hierarchical power was high  0.40 0.57 0.67 0.90 0.84 
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if the 
hierarchical power was medium  0.42 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.45 
Probability of choosing the manipulated rec. if the 
hierarchical power was low  0.48 0.44 0.38 0.29 0.30 
  




A6. Control Model Analysis 
Table 12. Logistic Linear Mixed-Effects Model with Control Variables 
Social cohesion, hierarchical power, recommendation elaboration, control variables:  
Fixed effects Estimate Odds ratio Std. error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept  -1.479  0.228  0.583  -2.538  0.011 * 
Social Cohesion [high]  0.787  2.197  0.220  3.572  3.54E-04 *** 
Hierarchical power [med.]  0.255  1.291  0.192  1.330  0.184  
Hierarchical power [high]  0.469  1.599  0.227  2.066  0.039 * 
Elaboration  -0.152  0.859  0.111  -1.369  0.171  
Social Cohesion [high] * 
Hierarchy [med.]  
-0.860  0.423  0.306  -2.810  0.005 ** 
Social Cohesion [high] * 
Hierarchy [high]  
-1.576  0.207  0.397  -3.972  7.13E-05 *** 
Social Cohesion [high] * 
Elaboration  
0.120  1.128  0.174  0.695  0.487  
Hierarchy [med.] * Elaboration  -0.286  0.751  0.141  -2.037  0.042 * 
Hierarchy [high] * Elaboration  0.401  1.493  0.142  2.821  0.005 ** 
Social Cohesion [high] * 
Hierarchy [med.] * Elab.  
1.067  2.907  0.248  4.300  1.71E-05 *** 
Social Cohesion [high] * 
Hierarchy [high] * Elab.  
0.670  2.014  0.283  2.471  0.013 * 
Age  0.093  1.098  0.114  0.817  0.414  
Gender [woman]  -0.031  0.969  0.132  -0.238  0.812  
Nationality [Belarus]  0.129  1.138  0.933  0.138  0.890  
Nationality [Bulgarian]  0.431  1.539  0.639  0.675  0.450  
Nationality [Chinese]  -0.656  0.519  0.801  -0.819  0.413  
Nationality [Colombian]  0.688  1.989  0.591  1.163  0.245  
Nationality [Dutch]  0.496  1.642  0.621  0.799  0.424  
Nationality [Egyptian]  0.489  1.631  0.527  0.928  0.354  
Nationality [French]  0.185  1.203  1.043  0.177  0.860  
Nationality [German]  0.052  1.053  0.690  0.075  0.940  
Nationality [Greek]  5.573  26.313  162.452  0.034  0.973  
Nationality [Hungarian]  1.780  5.927  0.748  2.380  0.017 * 
Nationality [Indian]  0.729  2.072  0.992  0.735  0.463  
Nationality [Iraqi]  0.548  1.730  0.783  0.700  0.484  
Nationality [Italian]  1.157  3.181  0.574  2.017  0.044 * 
Nationality [Jordanian]  0.454  1.574  0.702  0.646  0.518  
Nationality [Korea (Rep.)]  1.409  4.090  0.638  2.208  0.027 * 
Nationality [Lithuanian]  -5.182  0.006  132.642  -0.039  0.969  
Nationality [Mexican]  0.714  2.041  0.578  1.234  0.217  
Nationality [Moroccan]  0.759  2.137  0.715  1.062  0.288  
Nationality [Norwegian]  0.510  1.665  0.692  0.737  0.461  
Nationality [Pakistan]  0.154  1.167  0.967  0.160  0.873  
Nationality [Peruvian]  0.488  1.629  0.638  0.764  0.445  
Nationality [Romanian]  -0.542  0.581  1.100  -0.493  0.622  
Nationality [Russian]  0.390  1.476  0.786  0.496  0.620  
Nationality [Spanish]  0.998  2.712  0.541  1.842  0.065 . 
Nationality [Suisse]  0.411  1.508  0.891  0.461  0.644  
Nationality [Swedish]  0.922  2.515  0.764  1.207  0.228  
Nationality [Syrian]  1.465  4.326  0.701  2.088  0.037 * 
Nationality [Turkish]  0.312  1.367  0.800  0.390  0.696  
Nationality [US American]  -4.829  0.008  132.641  -0.036  0.971  
Nationality [Vietnamese]  0.600  1.822  0.566  1.059  0.289  
Culture FL [Cantonese]  1.834  6.261  0.810  2.263  0.024 * 
Culture FL [Chechen]  -0.168  0.845  0.861  -0.195  0.845  
Culture FL [Chinese]  1.164  3.204  0.619  1.880  0.060 . 
Culture FL [English]  0.656  1.926  1.084  0.604  0.546  
Culture FL [German]  0.675  1.964  0.521  1.295  0.195  
Culture FL [Greek]  -5.210  0.005  162.453  -0.032  0.974  




Table 12. Logistic Linear Mixed-Effects Model with Control Variables 
Culture FL [Hindi]  0.506  1.659  0.656  0.772  0.440  
Culture FL [Lithuanian]  5.964  38.903  132.641  0.045  0.964  
Culture FL [Romanian]  0.285  1.330  0.807  0.354  0.724  
Culture FL [Russian]  0.342  1.407  0.591  0.578  0.563  
Culture FL [Serbian]  1.056  2.875  0.735  1.437  0.151  
Culture FL [Shanghainese]  1.284  3.612  0.884  1.453  0.146  
Culture FL [Slovak]  5.071  15.938  132.642  0.038  0.970  
Culture FL [Tamil]  0.097  1.102  0.952  0.102  0.919  
Culture FL [Telugu]  -0.825  0.438  1.045  -0.790  0.430  
Culture FL [Turkish]  0.615  1.850  0.579  1.062  0.288  
Random effects  Var.  Std. dev.  Observ.  Groups   
Subject (intercept)  0  0  999  175   
Residuals  Min.  1Q  Median  3Q  Max.  
Residuals  -3.245  -0.690  -0.142  0.766  7.481  





Table 13. Logistic Linear Mixed-Effects Model with Control Variables 
Institutional isomorphism in terms of business function, institutional isomorphism in terms of location, 
recommendation elaboration, control variables:  
Fixed effects  Estimate Odds ratio Std. error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept  -0.768 0.464 0.459 -1.671 0.095 
Inst. isomorphism in terms of business funct. 
[medium]  -0.002 0.998 0.181 -0.012 0.990 
Inst. isomorphism in terms of business funct. 
[high]  -0.083 0.920 0.177 -0.470 0.638 
Inst. isomorphism in terms of location 
[medium]  -0.211 0.810 0.187 -1.127 0.260 
Inst. isomorp. in terms of location [high]  0.681 1.976 0.242 2.816 0.005 ** 
Elaboration  -0.459 0.632 0.087 -5.300 1.16E-07 *** 
Inst. isomorph. (bf)[med.] * Inst. isomorph. 
(loc) [med.]  0.454 1.574 0.305 1.489 0.136 
Inst. isomorph. (bf) [high] * Inst. isomorph. 
(loc) [med.]  0.160 1.174 0.298 0.539 0.590 
Inst. isomorph. (bf) [med.] * Inst. 
isomorph.(loc)[high]  -1.191 0.304 0.434 -2.747 0.006 ** 
Inst. isomorph. (bf) [high] * Inst. 
isomorph.(loc)[high]  -1.012 0.363 0.406 -2.496 0.013 * 
Inst. isomorph. (bf)[med.] * Elab.  0.880 2.410 0.145 6.073 1.26E-09 *** 
Inst. isomorph. (bf) [high] * Elab.  0.968 2.632 0.146 6.606 3.96E-11 *** 
Inst. isomorph.(loc)[med.] * Elab.  0.500 1.650 0.114 4.389 1.14E-05 *** 
Inst. isomorph. (loc)[high] * Elab.  0.218 1.243 0.126 1.734 0.083 . 
Inst. isom. (bf) [med.] * Inst. isom.(loc)[med] 
* Elab  -0.895 0.409 0.178 -5.023 5.09E-07 *** 
Inst. isom. (bf) [high] * Inst. isom.(loc)[med] * 
Elab  -0.732 0.481 0.181 -4.039 5.36E-05 *** 
Inst. isom. (bf) [med.] * Inst. isom.(loc)[high] 
* Elab  -0.245 0.783 0.208 -1.175 0.240 
Inst. isom. (bf) [high] * Inst. isom.(loc)[high] 
* Elab  -0.270 0.764 0.206 -1.311 0.190 
Age  0.071 1.074 0.085 0.835 0.404 
Gender [woman]  0.062 1.064 0.102 0.606 0.545 
Nationality [Belarus]  -0.560 0.571 0.785 -0.713 0.476 
Nationality [Bulgarian]  0.300 1.350 0.528 0.569 0.569 
Nationality [Chinese]  0.216 1.241 0.663 0.326 0.745 
Nationality [Colombian]  -0.180 0.835 0.481 -0.374 0.708 
Nationality [Dutch]  0.582 1.789 0.576 1.009 0.313 
Nationality [Egyptian]  0.109 1.115 0.421 0.258 0.797 
Nationality [French]  -0.232 0.793 0.847 -0.274 0.784 
Nationality [German]  0.204 1.226 0.591 0.345 0.730 
Nationality [Greek]  -0.158 0.854 0.921 -0.172 0.864 
Nationality [Hungarian]  0.557 1.745 0.538 1.035 0.301 
Nationality [Indian]  0.979 2.663 0.832 1.177 0.239 
Nationality [Iraqi]  0.322 1.380 0.533 0.603 0.546 
Nationality [Italian]  0.442 1.555 0.477 0.926 0.354 
Nationality [Jordanian]  -0.211 0.810 0.576 -0.366 0.715 
Nationality [Korea (Rep.)]  0.664 1.942 0.524 1.268 0.205 
Nationality [Lithuanian]  1.535 4.643 1.351 1.137 0.256 
Nationality [Mexican]  0.434 1.544 0.466 0.932 0.351 
Nationality [Moroccan]  -0.285 0.752 0.568 -0.502 0.616 
Nationality [Norwegian]  0.429 1.535 0.582 0.737 0.461 
Nationality [Pakistan]  0.818 2.265 0.623 1.312 0.190 
Nationality [Peruvian]  0.351 1.421 0.571 0.615 0.539 
Nationality [Romanian]  -0.313 0.731 0.923 -0.340 0.734 
Nationality [Russian]  0.316 1.372 0.659 0.479 0.632 
Nationality [Spanish]  0.390 1.476 0.422 0.923 0.356 
Nationality [Suisse]  0.940 2.559 0.770 1.220 0.222 




Table 13. Logistic Linear Mixed-Effects Model with Control Variables 
Nationality [Swedish]  0.848 2.335 0.536 1.581 0.114 
Nationality [Syrian]  -0.226 0.797 0.604 -0.375 0.708 
Nationality [Turkish]  0.130 1.139 0.666 0.195 0.845 
Nationality [US American]  0.896 2.450 1.172 0.765 0.445 
Nationality [Vietnamese]  0.421 1.524 0.437 0.963 0.335 
Culture FL [Cantonese]  -0.127 0.881 0.634 -0.200 0.842 
Culture FL [Chechen]  0.331 1.392 0.703 0.470 0.638 
Culture FL [Chinese]  -0.003 0.997 0.524 -0.006 0.995 
Culture FL [English]  -0.920 0.399 0.877 -1.048 0.294 
Culture FL [German]  0.192 1.211 0.466 0.412 0.680 
Culture FL [Greek]  0.297 1.346 0.901 0.330 0.742 
Culture FL [Hindi]  -0.396 0.673 0.560 -0.660 0.509 
Culture FL [Lithuanian]  -1.520 0.219 1.223 -1.244 0.214 
Culture FL [Romanian]  0.792 2.209 0.645 1.229 0.219 
Culture FL [Russian]  0.030 1.031 0.504 0.060 0.952 
Culture FL [Serbian]  0.265 1.303 0.613 0.432 0.666 
Culture FL [Shanghainese]  -0.544 0.581 0.711 -0.765 0.444 
Culture FL [Slovak]  -0.837 0.433 1.204 -0.695 0.487 
Culture FL [Tamil]  -0.319 0.727 0.814 -0.392 0.695 
Culture FL [Telugu]  -1.925 0.146 0.935 -2.059 0.040 * 
Culture FL [Turkish]  0.170 1.185 0.513 0.331 0.740 
Random effects  Var. Std. dev. Observ. Groups  
Subject (Intercept)  0 0 1513 179  
Residuals  Min. 1Q Median 3Q Max. 
Residuals  -3.487 -0.832 -0.163 0.870 7.524 
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